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1990–2019: Special 30th-anniversary issue! 
 
 
his EAP completes thirty years of 
publication and includes “items 
of interest,” “citations received,” 
and an “in memoriam” for soci-
ologist George Psathas, who died last No-
vember. Psathas was a co-founder of the 
Society for Phenomenology and the Hu-
man Sciences (SPHS) and a major advo-
cate for phenomenological studies in the 
social sciences and humanities. We repro-
duce several passages from his influential 
1973 Phenomenological Sociology. 
This EAP issue begins with a “book-
note” on philosopher Dan Zahavi’s Phe-
nomenology: The Basics, an introduction 
to phenomenological principles and meth-
ods. A second “booknote” focuses on Paul 
Krafel’s recent open-access digital book, 
Roaming Upward, which continues this 
naturalist’s perspicacious efforts to reverse 
environmental and human entropy. 
This issue includes five essays, the first 
of which is the third part of a 1999 confer-
ence presentation on Goethean science by 
the late philosopher Henri Bortoft. Sec-
ond, sociologist Julia Bennett overviews 
her doctoral research relating to belonging 
among families who have lived in one Eng-
lish town for multiple generations.  
 Third, environmental educator John 
Cameron continues his discussion of 
“lived interiority” by considering land-
scape character as understood by several 
well-known thinkers and writers. Fourth, 
Australian artist and photograph Sue Mi-
chael provides the introductory text and 
several works that were part of her recent 
exhibit, “Settled Areas,” sponsored by an 
art gallery in Thebarton, South Australia, a 
suburb of Adelaide.  
Last, to mark a thirtieth year of publica-
tion, EAP editor David Seamon discusses 
current conceptual and methodological 
concerns relating to phenomenology as a 
philosophy and research approach. He con-
siders: (1) placing phenomenology; (2) 
displacing phenomenology; and (3) evalu-
ating phenomenology. 
We are often asked the question, “What 
is phenomenology?” One useful way to 
help newcomers understand is providing 
definitions that can be studied and used to 
identify commonalities and differences. 
We end this thirtieth-year issue with 
twenty-three such definitions written by 
eminent phenomenological thinkers. 
 
Below: Sue Michael’s World’s End High-
way (2019, acrylic on canvas, 46 x 91 cm) 
for her recent South Australia painting ex-
hibit, “Settled Areas.” See her introduc-
tion to this exhibit and additional paintings 
(and one photograph), pp. 29–35.   
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Items of interest 
Environment, Space, Place is a “transdis-
ciplinary and interdisciplinary journal ded-
icated to environmental, spatial, and place-
oriented dimensions of knowledge.” The 
aim is to promote “conversations about 
how people think about and experience 
various environments, spaces, and places: 
real, virtual, mythical, or imagined.” Also 
important is understanding “how humanity 
interacts with and within its many environ-
ments.” ESP is the journal for the Interna-
tional Association for the Study of Envi-





Buildings & Landscapes is the biannual 
journal for the Vernacular Architecture Fo-
rum. One aim is to examine “the built 
world that most people experience every-
day—houses and cities, farmsteads and al-
leys, churches and courthouses, subdivi-
sions and shopping malls. The editors em-
phasize entries “strongly based on field 
work and archival research that views 







Julie Campoli, 2011. Made for 
Walking: Density and Neigh-
borhood Form. Cambridge, 
MA: Lincoln Institute. 
 
This volume provides detail guidance on 
ways to plan and design for density and in-
cludes a “density catalogue” of more than 
1,000 aerial photographs representing a 
range of residential densities from less than 
one to more than 200 units per acre. The 
author highlights six key environmental el-
ements: diversity, density, design, distance 
to transit, destination accessibility, and 
parking. 
The book includes detailed descriptions 
of 12 urban neighborhoods, “each covering 
a comfortable pedestrian walk zone of ap-
proximately 125 acres” and chosen “to 
show both their variety and their common-
alities.” The neighborhoods include LoDo 
and the Central Platte Valley, Denver, Col-
orado; Short North, Columbus, Ohio; 
Kitsilano, Vancouver, BC; Flamingo Park, 
Miami Beach, Florida; Little Portugal, To-
ronto, Ontario; Eisenhower East, Alexan-
dria, Virginia; Downtown and Raynolds 
Addition, Albuquerque, New Mexico; The 
Pearl District, Portland, Oregon; Green-
point, Brooklyn, New York; Little Italy, 
San Diego, California; Cambridgeport, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Old Pasa-
dena, Pasadena, California. 
 
Antonio Carvalho, 2018. Ar-
chitecture as Space for Peo-
ple. Lisbon: Caleidoscópio. 
 
This volume is a compilation of recent 
buildings and other designs by this Portu-
guese architect, who writes in his introduc-
tion that “To me as an architect, it makes 
no sense to create spaces devoid of peo-
ple…. It is people who inspire me to create 
spaces, imagining what they will need to 
perform their activities, the eventual pleas-
ure they will get from a special view, the 
surprise of turning a corner and discover-
ing a different space, ambience, or mate-
rial.” 
Architectural theorist Juhani Pallas-
maa writes in his introduction to the vol-
ume that he is touched by the “quiet and 
unpretentious considerateness and appro-
priateness [of Carvalho’s designs]. These 
works respect their context and even the 
minute features and values of the place, 
and the architect attempts to fuse these 
signs into the re-orchestrated entity.” 
 
Alexander Garvin, 2016. What 
Makes a Great City? Wash-
ington, DC: Island Press. 
 
This architect writes: “To explain what 
makes a great city, I decided to describe the 
ways in which the people who use great 
cities continually change the public realm 
so that it meets current needs…. The first 
two chapters explain what exactly is meant 
by the expression “the public real” and 
what the characteristics of a great public 
realm are. The next six chapters describe 
each of those characteristics in detail, as 
well as when and how they work or don’t 
work…. At the end of the book, I present 
twenty-first-century initiatives undertaken 
in Paris, Houston, Atlanta, Brooklyn, and 
Toronto that are making an already fine 
public realm even better—initiatives that 
demonstrate how any city can improve its 
public realm.” 
Garvin argues that a great public realm 
incorporates the following six characteris-
tics: (1) it is open to everyone; (2) it offers 
something for everyone; (3) it attracts and 
retains market demand; (4) it provides a 
framework for successful urbanization; (5) 
it sustains a habitable environment: and (6) 
it nurtures and supports a civil society. 
 
Jonathan Hale, 2017. Merleau-
Ponty for Architects, London: 
Routledge. 
 
This architectural theorist summarizes 
“what Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy has to 
offer specifically for architects. It locates 
architectural thinking in the context of his 
work, placing it in relation to themes such 
as space, movement, materiality and crea-
tivity, introduces key texts, helps decode 
difficult terms, and provides quick refer-
ence for further reading.” 
 
Thomas Hünefeldt and Annika 
Schlitte, eds., 2018. Situated-
ness and Place. Cham, Swit-
zerland: Springer. 
 
Edited by two philosophers, this volume’s 
11 chapters consider “the spatio-temporal 
contingency of human life.” The editors 
write that some thinkers examine this con-
tingency “in terms of ‘situation’, empha-
sizing the ‘situatedness’ of human experi-
ence and action,” while other researchers 
focus on “‘place’, emphasizing the ‘power 
of place’ and advocating a ‘topological’ or 
‘topological turn’ in the context of a lager 
‘spatial turn’.” 
The chapters of the volume illustrate the 
range of these possibilities; contributors 
include Edward Casey (“Place and Situa-
tion”); Jeff Malpas (“Place and Placed-
ness”); David Seamon (“Merleau-Ponty, 
Lived Body and Place: Toward a Phenom-
enology of Human Situatedness”); Shaun 
Gallagher (“Situating Interaction in Peri-
personal and Extrapersonal Space: Empir-
ical and Theoretical Perspectives”); 
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Thomas Hünefeldt (“The Place of 
Mind”); Annita Schlitte (“Place and Posi-
tionality: Anthropo(topo)logical Thinking 
with Helmuth Plessner”); Tobias Ho-
lischka (“Virtual Places and Real Places: 
A Distinction of Virtual Places from Pos-
sible and Fictional Worlds”); and Dylan 
Trigg (“Situated Anxiety: A Phenomenol-
ogy of Agoraphobia”). 
The sidebar below reproduces a portion 
of Malpas’s chapter and the lived relation 
between place and what he calls “placed-
ness.” 
 
Place and Placedness 
That there is a prima facie difference 
between place and placedness seems 
undeniable …. In simple terms, ‘plac-
edness’ or ‘being placed’ names a 
characteristic … of that which is 
placed, whereas ‘place’ names that to 
which what is placed stands in relation. 
    Placedness would thus seem … to 
presuppose place. On that basis, there 
can be no placedness without place, 
and the two notions are inextricably 
bound together even though they are 
also distinct—the same reasoning may 
also be applied to the notions of situa-
tion and situatedness or being-situated. 
    Yet what appears to be a simple and 
obvious difference here conceals a 
larger set of complications. There is a 
general tendency for place and placed-
ness not to be distinguished even in 
discussions in which the concepts play 
an important role—the most obvious 
indication of which is the widespread 
identification of place with some no-
tion of meaningful space, that is, with 
space as it is given meaning by a sub-
ject …. 
    The tendency to treat place in this 
way reflects a broader lack of atten-
tiveness to place as a genuinely sui 
generis concept …—a lack of atten-
tiveness that… often amounts to an ef-
fective reduction of place to placedness 
or the replacement of place by placed-
ness. 
    When this happens, the very notion 
of place undergoes an important shift, 
since placedness no longer involves 
standing in a genuine relation to place, 
but instead seems to imply that place 
somehow belongs to the character of 
that which is placed—as the valuation 
of space arises on the basis of the hu-
man being in space. If this sounds odd 
or obscure …, then the reason is 
simply that it is so. 
    Moreover, even though this implied 
shift to placedness over place is com-
monplace, its oddity or obscurity typi-
cally goes unremarked because the 
shift itself is seldom acknowledged 
(Jeff Malpas, 2018, p. 28, p. 29). 
 
Susan Ingham, 2017. Some 
Patterns of Living in the Pa-
cific Northwest, in K. Pontikis 
& Y. Rofѐ (eds.), In Pursuit of 
a Living Architecture: Contin-
uing Christopher Alexander’s 
Quest for a Humane and Sus-
tainable Building Culture 
(Champaign, IL: Common 
Ground, 2016), pp. 386–409. 
 
In this chapter from an edited collection on 
the work of architect Christopher Alexan-
der,  Seattle architect Susan Ingham gener-
ates a place and climate pattern language 
for residential architecture in North Amer-
ica’s Pacific Northwest: “creating and 
working with [Alexander’s] patterns can 
be a productive first step in solving many 
of a homeowner’s design problems…” 
Patterns “can also help to define the overall 
essence and character of the house.” 
Ingham groups her patterns in terms of 
four larger themes: (1) patterns of light 
(window walls; side lighting; interior win-
dows and screens of translucent glass); (2) 
exterior patterns (rain, hills, mountains, 
and water; deep-roof overhangs and eaves; 
balancing grand and intimate views); (3) 
interior patterns (outside in and inside out, 
open spaces with many built-ins; indoor 
rooms connected to outdoor rooms; open 
kitchen, dining, living, and deck; built-ins 
for every room); (4) color patterns (place 
color; natural colors of materials). 
 
Sandy Isenstadt, 2018. Elec-
tric Light: An Architectural 
History. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
This art historian “examines electric light 
as a form of architecture—as a new, 
uniquely modern kind of building mate-
rial.” He demonstrates how “the introduc-
tion of electric lighting at the end of the 
nineteenth century created new architec-
tural spaces and altered and sometimes 
eclipsed previously existing spaces.” The 
book is described as “the first sustained ex-
amination of the spatial effects of electric 
lighting. Isenstadt reconceives modernism 
in architecture to account for the new per-
ceptual conditions and visual habits that 
followed widespread electrification.” 
 
Grant Jarrett, ed., 2016. The 
House that Made Me: Writers 
Reflect on the Places and 
People that Defined Them. 
Tempe, Arizona: Spark Press. 
 
In the 19 essays in this collection, writers 
reflect “on the homes, neighborhoods, and 
experiences that helped shape them—
providing fresh insight into the concept of 
Home.” In his introduction, Jarrett writes: 
“[T]here are few things as potent, as vis-
ceral and multifaceted as the word 
[“home”] and what it represents. Nothing 
is more highly charged than first home, the 
rooms where our memories were born, the 
place where those first battles were fought 
and won or lost, where family was defined 
and redefined, where dreams were born 
and realized or reluctantly discarded. Rich 
with our earliest experience, it may have 
been, may still be, a source of great happi-
ness and great pain, its rooms overflowing 
with laughter, joy, fear, sorrow. Most 
likely, the image of that first home evokes 
a hodgepodge of thoughts, sensations and 
emotions, but regardless, it seems to reach 
out to us, to draw us back.” 
 
Jay T. Johnson and Soren C. 
Larsen, eds., 2013. A Deeper 
Sense of Place: Stories and 
Journeys of Collaboration in 
Indigenous Research. Corval-
lis: Oregon State Univ. Press. 
 
The 13 chapters of this edited collection 
present “academic and personal ap-
proaches to research when working collab-
oratively with Indigenous communities 
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across the globe.” Contributors address 
“the ethical, political, intellectual, and 
practical meanings of collaboration with 
Indigenous peoples” and focus on “the 
ways in which collaborative research can 
help Indigenous and settler communities 
find common ground through a shared 
commitment to land, people, and place.” 
 
Avril Maddrell and James D. 
Sidaway, eds., 2016. Death-
scapes. London: Routledge. 
 
The 15 chapters of this edited collection fo-
cus on “the relationship between 
space/place and death/bereavement in 
western societies. The chapters reflect a 
variety of scales ranging from individual 
and private domestic space to sites of sup-
port, accident, battle and remembrance in 
public space.” 
 
Michael Vincent McGinnis, 
2016. Science and Sensibility: 
Negotiating an Ecology of 
Place. Oakland, CA: Univ. of 
California Press. 
 
Drawing on examples from California and 
New Zealand, this political scientist exam-
ines “how place-based ecological negotia-
tion can influence conservation, restora-
tion, and environmental policy.” The side-
bar below is from the book’s preface, 
“Conversations with Sea and Stone.” 
 
Adaptive, resilient places 
[In this book, I] emphasize the need for 
a deeper appreciation of our place in the 
world. The chapters are based on my 
personal journey and my experience 
with diverse coastal and maritime 
places and peoples across the Pacific 
Ocean. 
    I have learned over time that there is 
one ocean that connects diverse peoples 
across the Pacific Ocean. We need to 
cultivate ecologically grounded values 
that can contribute to a science and sen-
sibility of place. To re-inhabit a place 
and community can represent a first 
step in beginning to respond to the eco-
logical threats and impacts we face in 
society. 
    While science is a key part of forging 
a more adaptive and resilient society, 
the cultivation of a renewed sense of 
place and community is essential to re-
spond to the complex socio-ecological 
problems we face. This is my biore-
gional message. The book notes that 
modern science is one way of knowing, 
but there are other ways, other episte-
mologies, and other values that contrib-
ute to a practice of a place-based living. 
There are other forms of knowledge that 
are as important, including local 
knowledge and traditional ecological 
knowledge systems (pp. ix–x). 
 
Adnan Morshed, 2015. Impos-
sible Heights: Skyscrapers, 
Flight, and the Master 
Builder. Minneapolis: Univ. of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
This architectural historian examines the 
aesthetics that emerged in the 1920s and 
1930s with the advent of airplanes and sky-
scrapers: “The captivat-
ing image of an airplane 
flying over the rising 
metropolis led many 
Americans to believe a 
new civilization had 
dawned.” This “lofty 
vantagepoint from the 
sky ushered in a modern-
ist impulse to cleanse 
crowded twentieth-cen-
tury cities in anticipation 
of an ideal world of to-
morrow. Inspired by 
great new heights, 
American architects be-
came central to this en-
deavor and were re-
garded as heroic avia-
tors.” Combining close 
readings of a broad range 
of archival sources, 
Morshed offers new in-
terpretations of works 
such as Hugh Ferriss’s 
Metropolis drawings, 
Buckminster Fuller’s 
Dymaxion houses, and 
Norman Bel Geddes’s 
Futurama exhibit at the 
1939 New York World’s 
Fair. Morshed argues 
that “these designers 
helped produce a new form of visuality: the 
aesthetics of ascension.” 
The image, below, from Impossible 
Heights, is Julian S. Krupa’s “Cities of To-
morrow,” on the back cover of a 1939 issue 
of Amazing Stories. 
 
Susan Opotow and Zachary 
Baron Shemtob, eds., 2018. 
New York after 9/11. NY: 
Fordham Univ. Press. 
 
Edited by a sociologist and criminologist, 
this collection of eleven chapters is said to 
offer “insightful, poignant, and critical ob-
servations about the way that New Yorkers 
and the City as a whole responded to and 
coped with September 11, 2001’s after-
math.” The chapters “clarify that recovery 
from 9/11 has been a long and braided pro-
cess that unfolded in different ways in dif-
ferent spheres.” The chapters “reveal the 
importance of collaborative efforts, tenac-
ity over time, and the value of community 
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voice, inclusion, and transparency.” Chap-
ter titles include “Conflict and Change: 
New York City’s Rebirth after 9/11”; 
“Building and the 9/11 Memorial”; “Urban 
Security in New York City after 9/11: Risk 
and Realities”; “Managing Fire Emergen-
cies in Tall Buildings: Design Innovations 
in the Wake of 9/11”; “Health Impacts of 
9/11”; “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Fol-
lowing 9/11”; and “Memory, Site, and Ob-
ject: September 11 Memorial Museum.” 
 
Friedlind Riedel, 2019. Atmos-
phere. In Jan Slaby and Chris-
tian von Scheve, eds. Affec-
tive Societies: Key Concepts. 
London: Routledge, pp. 85–95. 
 
This anthropologist overviews the research 
on atmosphere, which she defines as “a 
feeling, mood, or Stimmung that funda-
mentally exceeds an individual body and 
instead pertains primarily to the overall sit-
uation in which bodies are entrenched.” 
She explains that atmospheres are 
“smoothing forces that evoke coherence” 
and emphasizes that, as a concept, atmos-
phere “challenges a notion of feelings as 
the private mental states of a cognizant 
subject and instead construes feelings as 
collectively embodied, spatially extended, 
material, and culturally inflected. 
In this sense ‘atmosphere’ can be “con-
sidered a mereological [relating to the 
study of wholes] concept.” In other words, 
the concept has bearing on “the ways in 
which a multiplicity of bodies is part of, 
and entrenched in, a situation that encom-
passes it.” In this way, the concept does not 
“simply invoke coherence but also simu-
lates it, erases inconsistencies, and melts, 
unifies, and homogenizes by imposing an 
overarching significance onto elements 
that might otherwise be unrelated.” 
Riedel considers atmosphere in terms of 
four broad themes: (1) religious transfor-
mation; (2) mass mobilization; (3) pro-
cesses of political homogenization; and (4) 
the relationship of atmosphere to music 
and sound. She concludes that the value of 
atmosphere as a heuristic concept “is its 
mereological fabric that significantly ex-
ceeds the realm of (aesthetic) perception.” 
 
Richard Sennett, 2018. Build-
ing and Dwelling: Ethics for 
the City. New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux. 
 
This well-known sociologist hopes for the 
actualization of what he calls the “open 
city”—urban environments that celebrate 
freedom, flexibility, and resilience, in con-
trast to the opposite—the “closed city,” as-
sociated with physical and human control 
and order difficult to modify or replace. 
Throughout, Sennett emphasizes the dif-
ference between ville and cité—the former, 
the built form of the city; the latter, the 
city’s human affairs, actions, and, experi-
ences. Sennett’s focus is the ways through 
which the physical manifestations of the 
ville sustain or undermine the lived experi-
ences of the cité. He gives considerable at-
tention to how urban planning and design 
decisions involving the ville can generate a 
cité that is freer and more open rather than 
restrictive and regimented. 
Sennett identifies five design principles 
that might facilitate the open city: (1) pub-
lic realms in which human interactions 
might intensify; (2) porosity of urban 
boundaries whereby contrasting urban 
realms are drawn together; (3) punctuation 
of the city by markers like signature build-
ings or elements of street furniture; (4) an 
evolutionary approach to urban form, 
whereby the built environment is never 
complete but repairable and repurposable; 
and (5) a collage aesthetic that rejects rigid 
planning to allow places to differentiate 
themselves over time. See sidebar, below.  
 
Rupture and accretion 
Building the ville occurs in two frames 
of time. In the first, time’s arrow 
moves steadily forwards; buildings and 
spaces are added slowly to the environ-
ment. Things added to the built envi-
ronment are often small: a single house 
made or renovated, a vest-pocket park. 
In the second, time’s arrow moves for-
ward by big, bold declarations which 
rupture what existed in the environ-
ment before. It is the time of the mega-
project… The first time is adaptive in 
character, accounting the context of 
what’s already been made. This is Jane 
Jacobs’ domain of ‘slow growth’. The 
second can seem a malign time, violat-
ing or erasing context, as did Corbu-
sier’s Plan Voisin, and as do many 
smart cities that vaunt breaking tradi-
tional urban forms. ‘Now’ becomes the 
adversary of ‘before’. 
    The domain of the slowly growing, 
the adapting, the accreting tugs at us 
sentimentally, but rupture is inevitable 
in the modern built environment if only 
because modern buildings expire more 
rapidly than many buildings from ear-
lier periods. We now figure the 
lifespan of commercial high-rises at 
thirty-five to forty years, whereas the 
Georgian terraces which have lasted 
for hundreds of years could last further 
hundreds. The reasons do not lie in 
poor building construction, but rather 
in rigid specification, a consequence of 
core investing favoring investments in 
structures built absolutely fit for pur-
pose. As uses change, habitations 
evolve, the buildings outlive their use-
ful existence…. 
    The contraries of accretion and rup-
ture stimulate debate today in urban 
development throughout the world. 
Projects which rupture the existing ur-
ban fabric tend to be power boasts, par-
ticularly the symbolic public structures 
that politicians favor—Olympic stadi-
ums, art museums, aquariums (which 
were fashionable big-ticket items a few 
years ago). An aquarium is not of 
much value to a school struggling to 
find money for books; the appeal of 
growth through accretion is thus 
strengthened because it can seem by 
contrast to be bottom-up development 
in cities ruled top-down…. 
    [But] this debate about the dimen-
sions of rupture and accretion is… too 
complicated to be reduced to top-down 
versus bottom-up…. As in dealing with 
climate change, where we want to 
practice both adaptation and mitiga-
tion, it makes better sense to think of 
accretion over time and rupture by de-
sign as ways of ville-making that can 
run in parallel. Indeed, they need to do 
so: the building of a new railroad sta-
tion for Mexico City residents or the 
replacement of coal plants by solar-en-
ergy generators in Beijing aren’t pro-
jects that can ripen slowly in the full-
ness of time, but local adaptations to 
them may take a long time to work out 
(Richard Sennett, 2018, pp. 279–80). 
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In Memoriam: George Psathas (1929–2018) 
 
ociologist George Psathas died 
November 15, 2018, in West 
Newton, Massachusetts. He was 
professor of sociology at Boston 
University from 1968 until his retirement 
in 1997. Psathas was born in New Haven, 
Connecticut, and received his BA from 
Yale University in 1950, an MA at the 
University of Michigan in 1951, and a 
PhD from Yale in 1956. From 1963 to 
1968 he taught sociology at Washington 
University in St. Louis. 
    Psathas played a significant role in in-
troducing phenomenology to American 
social scientists. In 1978, he founded Hu-
man Studies, one of the first social-sci-
ence journals emphasizing (and accept-
ing) phenomenological research. In 1980, 
he co-founded (with sociologist Law-
rence Weider) the Society for Phenom-
enology and the Human Sciences 
(SPHS). 
    Holding its annual meetings concur-
rently with the Society for Phenomenol-
ogy and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), 
SPHS was one of the first conference 
venues for paper sessions on environ-
mental and architectural phenomenology. 
Early on, Psathas invited EAP co-found-
ers Robert Mugerauer and David Sea-
mon to organize SPHS sessions on envi-
ronmental and place topics; the first ses-
sion was held at the 1981 meeting in Ev-
anston, Illinois, and these special ses-
sions continued for several years after. 
     Psathas actualized an instinctive 
recognition that phenomenological work 
could offer a valuable bridge to integrate 
the various social sciences and to present 
an understanding of human life that was 
more accurate, inclusive, and compre-
hensive than the reductive portraits of-
fered by analytic, quantitative science. In 
memoriam, we reprint a portion of the in-
troduction he wrote for his ground-break-
ing edited collection, Phenomenological 
Sociology: Issues and Applications (NY: 
Wiley, 1973), which included chapters by 
such key phenomenological figures as 
Egon Bittner, Fred Dallmayr, John 
O’Neil, Herbert Spiegelberg, Kurt 
Wolff, Helmut Wagner, and Richard 
Zanner. 
 
The world of everyday life 
The human actor, as a socialized 
member of society, operates within a 
lifeworld that is pregiven and already 
organized. The language he learns, the 
culture he acquires, and the social 
structures within which he lives pro-
vide him with a stockpile of typifica-
tions, of recipes for interpreting and 
acting, and with a stock of knowledge 
that forms the basis for even his imag-
inative exploration of courses of ac-
tion other than those he already 
knows. 
    The lifeworld (Lebenswelt) is not 
only pre-structured, but the meanings 
of the elements contained within it are 
also pregiven. The stock of 
knowledge provides the actor with 
rules for interpreting interactions, so-
cial relationships, organizations, and 
institutions. And when the unexpected 
happens or new situations occur and 
the taken-for-granted is thrown into 
question, only then is he forced to 
consider alternative schemes of inter-
pretation. 
    Thus, within the standpoint of the 
natural attitude, the individual is not 
motivated to question the meaningful 
structures of his lifeworld. His interest 
is a practical one and his task is to live 
in rather than to make a study of the 
lifeworld. It remains for the social sci-
entist to adopt the stance of a disinter-
ested observer and to study the life-
world of others. 
    Though he may draw on his own 
experiences, since he is also a human 
being who may have lived in similar 
situations, he does not study the life-
world from his own perspective. He 
attempts to transcend the everyday in-
tentionalities in which he is the center 
of his own existence and adopt an-
other point of reference. Depending 
on the problem he has chosen for 
study, as this may be defined within 
the scientific stock of knowledge, the 
social scientist selects that which is 
relevant. 
    His concern is not so much with the 
particular individuals who are subject 
of his study, but with the types they 
represent. His effort is to see through 
the particulars to that which is essen-
tial to the type, those elements with-
out which the type would not be what 
it is. 
    In this sense, what he does resem-
bles what people do in an ordinary, 
mundane fashion when perceiving the 
objects of the world. Objects are con-
cretely empirical as they appear to us. 
We see a person, living, appearing be-
fore us. This corporeal presence of a 
meaningful object whose various as-
pects, though not directly seen, are 
nevertheless known to us. The 
pregiven type, known to us as “human 
body,” does not refer to any one par-
ticular body but to the purely ideal, 
meaning creation of our human 
minds. 
    In this realm of the ideal, objectiv-
ity can occur in that any one of us can 
share the identical meaning creation. 
We can, in the abstract, know the con-
cept of the human body as we share 
the same language and accept the 
meanings it provides for us. We need 
not explicate the fullness of meanings 
and we are hardly aware of all that we 
know as we proceed. The meaning 
structures with which we operate are, 
for us, real, though we may be only 
dimly aware that they have a different 
reality from empirical objects 
(Psathas 1973, pp. 9–10). 
 
   
 
The problem of  
intersubjectivity 
This lifeworld is experienced as an 
intersubjective world, known and ex-
perienced by other people who under-
stand it and who also experience it as 
an intersubjective world. 
Since the lifeworld is given to people 
in the natural attitude as an intersub-
jective world, one of the tasks of the 
social scientist is to describe the ex-
perience of intersubjectivity. At a 
more philosophical level, he may ask 
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how intersubjectivity is possible at 
all—but this quest must be recog-
nized as a different question, the an-
swer to which philosophers them-
selves have not yet agreed upon. 
There emerges then the clear neces-
sity to distinguish between the study 
of the lifeworld as it is experienced 
by ordinary human beings living in it 
and questions about how the life-
world is possible, how one can know 
another’s mind, whether society is 
objectively real, and so forth. 
This is not to say that these questions 
cannot or should not be approached 
by social scientists. Rather, they must 
be recognized as a different order of 
question. The solution of these prob-
lems is not necessary before proceed-
ing with studies of the lifeworld. 
Thus, for social scientists, the study 
of people must take them as they 
are—people who suspend doubt, live 
in the natural attitude, and live with 
the certainty that the social and natu-
ral worlds exist. The serious and 
careful study of how people live with 
and renew their assumptions requires 
close and faithful description. 
It is to that undertaking that we urge 
our fellow social scientists to address 
themselves. The study of how social 
order is produced by humans in their 
everyday activities is a study whose 
value may be as considerable as the 
more general and theoretical study of 
how social order is possible at all 
Psathas 1973, p. 16). 
 
The phenomenological 
approach as a paradigm 
The phenomenological approach does 
not restrict the observer to a narrow 
set of methods or perspectives. There 
is no formula or recipe for procedures 
that is to be applied ready-made to 
the problem being studied. The 
“steps” described by Spiegelberg in 
his discussion of the phenomenologi-
cal method are not sequential stages 
[H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenologi-
cal Movement, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1982, p. 678]. One cannot pick up a 
book of rules as to how to do a phe-
nomenological analysis and jump in. 
The adoption of a new paradigm for 
research involves the researcher in a 
major formulation of his [or her] 
thinking. 
     In adopting a phenomenological 
perspective, the social scientist must 
evolve a way of looking that is differ-
ent from a positivist-science approach 
to data. In fact, he [or she] must learn 
to regard as data some objects, 
events, and activities he [or she] pre-
viously did not “see” at all. In this re-
spect, a new paradigm enables him 
[or her] to see “facts that were there 
all the time.” 
    At this stage of development of so-
ciology, an initial reaction is to try to 
fit the phenomenological into the par-
adigm of normal science, to reformu-
late questions or findings, to show 
that the data are the same, and to rein-
terpret or rephrase the resulting ac-
counts to show that the translation 
renders the “new” results consistent 
with what is already known or has 
been done all along. 
    These efforts represent a necessary 
step, perhaps, in the struggle to un-
derstand the significance of a new 
paradigm, or, for that matter, to un-
derstand whether it is a new paradigm 
at all. Once a paradigm is grasped, 
understood, and used, then the results 
of research are presented within such 
new formulations or conceptualiza-
tions as are deemed necessary, and no 
argumentative or comparative posture 
that argues that this approach is “bet-
ter” or “more valid” or “truer to life” 
than some other is mentioned. The 
work stands on its own and the reader 
is expected to understand the para-
digm it embodies. 
    It will be evident, both from the es-
says in this book and from other 
works, that this day has not yet ar-
rived in phenomenological sociology. 
There are still justificatory argu-
ments, programmatic statements and 
exhortations to the reader, and expla-
nations of why it is important that this 
approach is used. 
    In contrast, the articles in current 
issues (1971–1972) of the American 
Journal of Sociology or the American 
Sociological Review spend little if 
any time arguing the merits of the ap-
proaches used. There is a quality of 
“this is the way sociology is done” 
about these works, a kind of certainty 
about method and approach and a 
lack of self-consciousness or concern 
about the validity of the paradigm for 
the study of the problem at hand. The 
paradigm used is so taken-for-granted 
that it is hardly likely that the authors 
of the articles could present an ana-
lytic description of it. 
    What Kuhn refers to as a “para-
digm shift” does not occur in an in-
stant as does the gestalt switch (e.g., 
the drawing that appears either as a 
vase or as two faces). “The transfer of 
allegiance from paradigm to para-
digm is a conversion experience that 
cannot be forced” [T. Kuhn, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962]. Yet 
the shift from one paradigm to an-
other is possible, as evidenced by the 
fact that new paradigms are created 
by those already familiar with the ex-
isting ones of normal science. 
    Whether it is fruitful to attempt 
conversions can be argued. Our view 
is that the presentation of a variety of 
problems, each being studied from a 
phenomenological perspective, can 
stand as evidence of the possible con-
tributions of a new paradigm. Those 
who are engaged in research on the 
same topics from different paradigm 
perspectives can thereby make more 
informed decisions about the value of 
a phenomenological approach to the 
study of the social world (Psathas 










Dan Zahavi, 2019. Phenomenology: The Basics. London: Routledge. 
 
ince 2000, there has appeared a 
spate of books claiming to intro-
duce readers to phenomenology. 
Philosopher Dermot Moran’s 
Introduction to Phenomenology (2000); 
psychotherapist Linda Finlay’s Phenom-
enology for Therapists (2011); and edu-
cator Max van Manen’s Phenomenology 
of Practice (2014) remain the three most 
accessible and most useful introductions. 
Just published is the most recent entry 
to this list—Danish philosopher Dan Za-
havi’s Phenomenology: The Basics, 
which focuses on “the overarching philo-
sophical concerns and common themes 
that have united and continue to unite 
[phenomenology’s] proponents.”  
Emphasizing mostly the phenomeno-
logical thinking of Edmund Husserl, 
Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty (“three thinkers whose deci-
sive influence on the development of phe-
nomenology is undeniable”), Zahavi 
breaks his discussion into three parts: 
▪ First, a review of phenomenol-
ogy’s “foundational issues,” 
overviewed via the headings of 
“the phenomena”; “intentional-
ity”; “methodological consider-
ations”; “science and lifeworld”; 
“surface and depth phenomenol-
ogy”; and “Merleau-Ponty’s 
preface to Phenomenology of 
Perception.” 
▪ Second, a discussion of two spe-
cific phenomenological topics—
“spatiality and embodiment” 
and “intersubjectivity and soci-
ality”; 




chology, qualitative research, 
and cognitive science.” 
 
As an entry in Routledge’s new 
series, “The Basics,” the volume is 
just over 150 pages and in pocket-
book size. In this sense, the text is 
more like a preliminary overview than 
an in-depth introduction. At the same 
time, however, this brevity is useful in 
that the book’s accessible outline readily 
locates several of phenomenology’s key 
topical and methodological concerns pre-
sented in a way that most newcomers 
should be able to understand. 
As a philosopher, Zahavi gives most at-
tention (and citations) to work by philos-
ophers. In the book’s third part, his dis-
cussion of the use of phenomenology in 
the human sciences is a start for demon-
strating its conceptual and practical value 
for professions and for academic fields 
other than philosophy (though he pro-
vides no indication of the important in-
roads made by environmental and archi-
tectural phenomenology, including the 
pivotal phenomenological studies on 
place and lived emplacement by philoso-
phers Edward Casey and Jeff Malpas).  
In the sidebars, right and next page, we 
highlight selections from Zahavi’s text 
that focus on methodological, epistemo-
logical, and ontological concerns.                                                                           
Straddling ontology & 
epistemology 
By insisting on the fact that mind and 
world must be explored simultane-
ously, phenomenology offers a per-
spective that straddles or undermines 
a traditional distinction between epis-
temology and ontology. 
    Traditionally, one has distinguished 
the question of how we come to un-
derstand and have knowledge of the 
world from questions pertaining to the 
nature of reality. A tempting and easy 
move is to insist that, whereas an an-
swer to the former question might in 
various ways appeal to and involve 
subjective and experiential processes, 
the answer to the latter question has 
quite deliberately been to subtract any 
subjective contributions we make in 
order to account for reality from “a 
view from nowhere.” 
    By focusing on the phenomena, 
however, phenomenology is at once 
analyzing our way of understanding 
and experiencing the world, and at the 
same time, the objects and their 
modes of appearance. This is why 
Heidegger in Being and Time can 
write that ontology is only possible as 
phenomenology, and that the analysis 
of our being-in-the-world is the key to 
every ontological exploration. 
    More generally speaking, phenom-
enologists would dispute that the rela-
tion between world and subjectivity is 
merely accidental, as if they were like 
two pieces of Lego, which can either 
hang together or be separated. The 
lesson of intentionality is that the 
mind is essentially open, and that re-
ality is essentially manifestable. 
    For something to count as real, it 
must in principle be something we 
can encounter, though the mode of 
encounter can vary: Perceptual ac-
quaintance, practical engagement, and 
scientific investigation are merely 
some of the possible forms. 
    To reject this idea, and to claim that 
the moon, a neuron, a deck of cards, 
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or a communal ritual have an unfath-
omable and hidden true being, that 
what they really are is something 
completely divorced from any context 
of use, network of meaning, or theo-
retical framework, and that whatever 
experiential and theoretical perspec-
tive we might adopt on them is conse-
quently bound to miss its target, is not 
only a deeply obfuscating claim, but 
also one that is epistemologically na-
ïve. On what basis and from what per-
spective could such a claim ever be 
justified? 
    We cannot look sideways at our ex-
periences in order to see to what ex-
tent they match with reality. This is 
so, not because such a view is ex-
tremely hard to reach, but because the 
very idea of such a view is nonsensi-
cal. Any understanding of reality is by 
definition perspectival. Effacing our 
perspective does not bring us any 
closer to the world. It merely prevents 
us from understanding anything about 
the world at all (Dan Zahavi, pp. 27–
28). 
 
The focus of phenomenology is on 
the intersection between mind and 
world, neither of which can be under-
stood in separation from each other. 
We are what we are as a function of 
our world-involvement, and the world 
understood as the fundamental con-
text of meaning is also only what it is 
because of our involvement with it. 
    To ask what one is without the 
other is like asking what a back-
ground is in itself, independently of 
















Our relationship to the world is so 
fundamental, so obvious and natural, 
that we normally do not reflect upon 
it. It is this domain of ignored obvi-
ousness that phenomenology seeks to 
investigate. The task of phenomenol-
ogy is not to obtain new empirical 
knowledge about different areas in the 
world, but rather to comprehend the 
basic relation to the world that is pre-
supposed by any such empirical in-
vestigation. 
    When phenomenology emphasizes 
the methodological necessity of a type 
of reflective reserve—what Husserl 
has called the epoché and reduc-
tions—this is not because phenome-
nology intends to desert the world in 
favor of pure consciousness, but be-
cause we can only make those inten-
tional threads that attach us to the 
world visible by slacking them 
slightly. 
    The world is, as Merleau-Ponty 
writes, wonderful. It is a gift and a 
riddle. But in order to realize this, it is 
necessary to suspend our ordinary 
blind and thoughtless taking the world 
for granted. Normally, I live in a natu-
ral and engaged naïve world-relation. 
But as a philosopher, I cannot make 
do with such a naive world-immer-
sion. I must distance myself from it, if 
ever so slightly, in order to be able to 
account for it. This is why Merleau-
Ponty argues that an analysis of our 
being-in-the-world presupposes the 
phenomenological reduction. 
    The phenomenological investiga-
tion proceeds from the factual to the 
essential, but that is not where the 
analysis ends. The focus on the essen-
tial is not the goal, but a means to un-
derstand, conceptualize, and articulate 
the depth of our factual existence. 
    The focus on essential structures is 
due to a wish to capture the richness 
of the factual, and not because of a 
desire to abstract from and ignore fac-





Wonder over the world 
Merleau-Ponty characterizes phenom-
enology as a perpetual critical      
(self-)reflection. It should not take an-
ything for granted, least of all itself. It 
is, to put it differently, a constant 
meditation. 
   Merleau-Ponty’s point here is that 
phenomenology is always en route. 
This also comes to the fore in Mer-
leau-Ponty’s famous assertion that 
“the most important lesson of the re-
duction is the impossibility of a com-
plete reduction.” The reduction must 
be seen as a particular reflective 
move, and Merleau-Ponty’s point is 
that we as finite creatures are incapa-
ble of effectuating an absolute reflec-
tion that once and for all would allow 
us to cut our ties to our world-im-
mersed life in order to survey it from 
a view from nowhere. 
    Even the most radical reflection de-
pends on and is linked to an            
unreflected life that, as Merleau-
Ponty puts it, remains its initial, con-
stant, and final situation. To say that 
the reduction cannot be completed is 
not to say that it cannot be carried out. 
But this procedure is something that 
has to be performed repeatedly, rather 
than completed once and for all. 
    To that extent, Merleau-Ponty’s re-
marks about the unfinished character 
of phenomenology and about the in-
complete reduction are two ways of 
making the same point. As Merleau-
Ponty points out in closing [in the 
“preface” to Phenomenology of Per-
ception], however, the fact that phe-
nomenology remains unfinished, the 
fact that it is always under way, is not 
a defect or flaw that should be 
mended, but rather one of its essential 
features. 
    As a wonder over the world, phe-
nomenology is not a solid and inflexi-
ble system, but rather in constant 














A pragmatic attitude 
Any method, procedure, or approach 
that is supposed to merit the label 
phenomenology must be familiar with 
phenomenological theory. This is a 
necessary requirement. 
    In a non-philosophical context, 
however, a relevant and creative use 
of central phenomenological concepts 
such as lifeworld, intentionality, em-
pathy, pre-reflective experience, hori-
zon, historicity, lived body, and so 
forth will be more valuable and pro-
ductive than a strict adherence to and 
insistence on the performance of the 
epoché and reduction, since the latter 
procedures have an explicit philo-
sophical focus and aim. 
    Ultimately, those interested in ap-
plied phenomenology should adopt a 
pragmatic attitude and be less con-
cerned with whether or not the proce-
dure accords with Husserl’s or Mer-
leau-Ponty’s own ideas about how to 
apply phenomenology. After all, the 
decisive question is not whether the 
research or the practice qualifies as 
orthodox phenomenology, but 
whether it is of high quality. To qual-
ify as good phenomenological re-
search, the phenomenological tools 
being employed must show their per-
tinence, must make a valuable differ-
ence, must allow for, say, new in-
sights or better therapeutic interven-
tions. 
    We should assess the value of the 
procedure on the basis of the results it 
delivers (Dan Zahavi, pp. 138–39). 
 
A tradition quite alive 
For a while, phenomenology was out 
of fashion, replaced and superseded by 
other theory formations such as critical 
theory, structuralism, and deconstruc-
tion. There is no question, however, 
that phenomenology has had some-
thing of a revival during the last two 
decades. There are many reasons for 
this, but one surely is that the facile 
dismissal of the subject of experience 
in favor of a focus on sign systems, 
language games, discourses, and so 
forth, has been found wanting. 
    Contrary to a widespread misunder-
standing, the central claim of phenom-
enology has never been that an inves-
tigation of subjectivity is sufficient if 
we want to understand the natural, his-
torical, social, and cultural realm. 
    The claim was rather that such an 
investigation is necessary and indis-
pensable. If we want to understand the 
world we are living in, we need to fac-
tor the role played by embodied, per-
ceiving, thinking, and feeling agents, 
and here phenomenology has some-
thing to offer. 
    Far from being simply a tradition of 
the past, phenomenology is quite alive 
and in a position to make valuable con-
tributions to contemporary thought. 
[Much of the work] is currently being 
done in two directions: inward (and 
backward) and outward (and forward). 
    On the one hand, we find a continu-
ing engagement and conversation with 
the classical authors. The philosophi-
cal resources and insights to be found 
in Husserl’s Heidegger’s, and Mer-
leau-Ponty’s work are evidently not 
yet exhausted. On the other hand, an 
increasing amount of dialogue is tak-
ing place between phenomenology and 
other philosophical traditions and em-
pirical disciplines. 
    In my view, phenomenology should 
continue to pursue this two-pronged 
strategy. It is hard to predict how many 
self-avowed phenomenologists there 
will be 100 years from now. But I am 
quite confident that the basic insights 
found in phenomenology will continue 
to appeal to and attract and inspire 














Paul Krafel, 2019. Roaming Upward [digital book available in open-source 
format at https://roamingupward.net/]. 
 
aturalist Paul Krafel’s new 
book, Roaming Upward, is 
now available on line in open-
access format. As in his ear-
lier Seeing Nature (Chelsea Green, 1998), 
Krafel aims to foster an awareness of 
rates of flow and to suggest ways 
whereby entropy-generating flows might 
be shifted to activate generative, entropy-
reducing possibilities.  
All of Krafel’s work, including Roam-
ing Upward, can fairly be called a phe-
nomenology of the two laws of thermody-
namics, particularly the second law, 
which states that all actions left to their 
own devices tend toward greater disorder 
and fewer possibilities. Making use of 
vivid examples drawn largely from the 
natural world, Krafel considers how vi-
cious spirals of increasing disorder might 
become virtuous spirals of reconstruction 
and regeneration. 
In the following sidebars is a portion of 
Krafel’s account of “Gaia dams”—one 
example of how natural forces can work 
to slow the rate at which life-enhancing 
materials flow out of natural systems. 
The book is available at: https://roam-
ingupward.net/. 
                        
                                                          
“One wet piece at a time” 
One delightful example I’ve come to 
call Gaia dams. They can be seen eas-
iest after a rain. Dead leaves and 
stems float in the runoff, getting wet. 
Wet surfaces stick together. As they 
raft along, they drift against some-
thing (a rock, a plant stem, anything 
holding its place in the flow) and be-
come lodged. 
    Other floating things drift by and 
adhesion pulls their surfaces against 
these lodged surfaces, and the area of 
lodged leaves grows larger. A small 
dam forms. Each new leaf sticking to 
the dam forces the water to flow a bit 
more off to the side to go around it. 
The dam lengthens across the slope 
until finally the runoff starts to ooze 
over the dam. 
    But now that brings the wet drifting 
leaves in contact with the top of the 
dam and they start sticking to the top, 
raising the level of the dam. The mo-
ment a leaf sticks to the top, that be-
comes a high point and the water can-
not flow that way. The current shifts 
to the next lowest point on the dam, 
which carries soggy leaves to that 
point, building it up. 
    Through this slow process of clog-
ging leaves that  shift the current from 
low spot to low spot, the height of the 
dam rises in a remarkably level way. 
And once the entire dam has achieved 
this height, the runoff then flows 
around one of the edges of the dam 
again, which carries soggy leaves 
there, and it clogs up again, extending 
the width of the dam still farther 
across the slope. 
    Since the water cannot go around 
now, it starts to go over the top, start-
ing another round of raising. Like the 
shuttle of a loom working its way 
back and forth, weaving loose fibers 
into homespun cloth, the current shifts 
from low spot to low spot all along 
the length of the dam, building it up 
and to the side, one wet piece at a 
time. 
    The dam’s size tends to be propor-
tional to the surface area of the float-
ing debris. Grass clippings and pine 
needles have relatively small surfaces, 
so their dams are only a centimeter or 
so high. Deciduous tree leaves, with 
their large surface areas, can form 
dams five or six centimeters high. 
N 
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“The work grows on itself” 
These Gaia dams are resilient. If I 
make a break in one of the dams, the 
backed-up water starts to rush through 
the gap. This flow carries floating 
leaves to the breach. As these leaves 
drift through, the wet surfaces on the 
edge of the breach pull some of the 
leaves against them. The breach clots 
up just like blood in a cut on your 
skin. 
    These little self-forming dams form 
everywhere, on forest slopes and in 
street gutters (though street sweepers 
sweep them away). Gaia dams slow 
down the rate at which life-enhancing 
materials flow out of the system. 
Later, these dams become mulched 
seedbeds for the trapped seeds germi-
nating within them. 
    These Gaia dams accummulate 
power. The first generation creates 
tiny dams across the thin channels 
flowing across the area. The ponds 
behind these dams trap silt and other 
debris flowing through. This deposi-
tion raises and levels the area behind 
the dam, forcing the next runoff to 
flow a bit broader and therefore thin-
ner. 
    This thinness allows more dams to 
form. More of the surface becomes 
covered with these dams and the silt 
that settles behind them. More seeds 
can sprout over the area, creating 
more plant surface area that will 
eventually become more floating 
things for future dams. 
    Through this small but cumulative 
process, life can cover bare surfaces 
with an initial layer of thin soil. The 
work grows on itself. 
 
Making Porous Stone Dams 
[see lower photograph, above right] 
I built a small “dam” of three stones in the 
flow of gulley water, which led to a pool 
forming behind the dam. Once the pool’s 
outflow was less than inflow, water 
backed up as more water also flowed 
through and around  dam. As long as the 
outflow was less than the inflow, the wa-
ter in the pool kept rising and soon started 
to run across the road [upper right in pho-
tograph]. 
In examining my stone dam more 
closely, I noted that the damned water 
was flowing between and around the 
three stones with considerable force. I 
found several smaller, fist-sized stones 
and placed them where water was rushing 
through the original stones most force-
fully. This additional blockage made the 
pool’s water level rise even more and in-
creased the flow of water across the road. 
The more stones I added to the dam, the 
more the flow of water across the road. 
Using this method, I did not need heavy 
runoff to raise the level of the pool; with 
the dam’s reducing outflow, only moder-
ate inflow was needed to re-route some 
runoff across the road with the result that 
the gully’s erosive damage was reduced 
as water was distributed more widely.  
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Seeing and Understanding Holistically 
Goethean Science and the Wholeness of Nature—Part III 
Henri Bortoft 
 
Bortoft (1938–2012) was a philosopher, physicist, and science educator who wrote Taking Appearance Seriously (2012) and the 
influential Wholeness of Nature (1996), which includes a much more thorough discussion of Goethe’s phenomenological method. 
The essay presented here was originally the fourth part of a paper for the conference, “Goethean Science in Holistic Perspective: 
Scientific, Ethical, and Educational Implications,” held at Columbia University’s Teacher College, New York City, May 20–22, 
1999; the first  parts of this paper were published in the summer/fall 2018 and winter/spring 2019 issues of EAP; the last part will 
be published in the winter/spring 2020 issue. Note that, in the paper’s original written version, Bortoft does not provide complete 
references. Here, we have added citations as available, but some works remain unreferenced. The paper is published with the per-
mission of Jacqueline Bortoft. The editor thanks Stephen Wood for proofing and referencing assistance. © 2019 Jacqueline Bortoft. 
oethe’s way of seeing dynamic 
wholeness is encapsulated in 
his remark to Schiller that there 
must be a way of seeing nature 
that “presented her as working and alive, 
striving out of the whole into the parts”(my 
emphasis). We notice here a reversal in 
perception: not from the parts to the whole, 
but from the whole into the parts. The parts 
are seen within the whole, instead of seeing 
the whole arise out of the parts. This way 
of seeing nature, “striving out of the whole 
into the parts,” is illustrated by Goethe’s 
own work on the metamorphosis of flow-
ering plants and also in current Goethean 
research—e.g., Craig Holdrege, Mark 
Riegner, and Wolfgang Schad’s interest in 
the wholeness of the animal organism and 
the organization of mammals as an organic 
whole [1]. 
There are two common misunderstand-
ings of Goethe’s way of seeing the meta-
morphosis of flowering plants. First, there 
is the misunderstanding that what he meant 
by metamorphosis is a historical or procre-
ational change—i.e., that one organ 
changes directly into a different organ as if, 
for example, a petal changes into a stamen. 
This misunderstanding has been particu-
larly encouraged by erroneously thinking 
about Goethe in Darwinian terms. 
The other misunderstanding is to sup-
pose that Goethe thinks of the different or-
gans up the stem—leaf, sepal, petal, sta-
men—as being formed on the same pattern 
according to a common plan. This so-
called “ground plan” is imagined to be 
what the different organs have in com-
mon—their lowest common denominator. 
It is supposed that this is what Goethe 
means by the Urorgan, a term often trans-
lated either as “primal organ” or “arche-
typal organ” (each of which is misleading 
in its own way, the first leading in the di-
rection of Darwinism; the second, in the di-
rection of Platonism). Similarly, when 
Goethe talks about the Urpflance, it is sup-
posed that he means what all the many dif-
ferent plants have in common—the group 
plan of all plants. Here, again, the terms 
“primal plant” and “archetypal plant” are 
misleading. 
These misinterpretations can be dis-
pelled by looking at what Goethe says 
(though he does not always help himself 
here) and, on this basis, learning to see the 
plant “striving out of the whole into the 
parts.” It will help to first consider what 
others have said about Goethe before con-
sidering what Goethe says himself. At the 
start, however, we should note that it is un-
realistic to consider Goethe in isolation 
from the context of his time, a period when 
the search for “archetypal forms” was a 
concern of many thinkers. In Germany, 
this interest was known as “transcendental 
morphology”; in France, “philosophical 
anatomy.” This approach extended to all 
organisms—for example, the attempt to 
find an archetypal form for all vertebrates 
(pursued especially by Richard Owen in 
England). 
Comments made about Goethe, there-
fore, are typical of what is said of the mor-
phological approach in general. In fact, 
Goethe (who coined the term “morphol-
ogy”) is almost invariably taken as repre-
sentative of this school of biological 
thought, even though his way of thinking 
is dynamical throughout and is different 
from the more static thinking of others with 
whom he is often associated in the search 
for archetypal forms in the organic world. 
 
earing this historical context in 
mind, the following are typical ex-
amples of the kind of thing said 
about Goethe, together with similar state-
ments about the project of transcendental 
anatomy in general and the contribution of 
Richard Owen in particular. These exam-
ples are taken from books that happen to be 
on my shelves [2]: 
 
“Goethe searched for the ideal archetype 
of the vegetable world, the general plan 
common to all plants.” 
 
“Goethe perceived the unity of plan or 
structure common to whole groups of or-
ganic beings.” 
 
“Goethe believed that nature, despite its 
diversity, was a manifestation of a single 
plan or ‘Idea’. Consequently, it was his ob-
ject to reveal the underlying unity of na-
ture.” 
 
“Seemingly influenced by Plato’s theory of 
Universals, Goethe was transfixed by uni-
formities and commonalities in nature.” 
 
“The distinguishing characteristic of tran-
scendental anatomy was the presupposi-
tion of an Ideal Plan or Type that lay be-
hind the great multiplicity of visible struc-
tures in the animal and plant kingdoms.” 
 
“For Owen, … nature’s plan could be 
demonstrated … by seeking the underlying 
unity beneath the diversity of living forms. 
He sought the ‘archetype’ or ground plan 









vertebrates, are modelled. The archetype 
was an idealized vision of the simplest form 
of living creature, from which the anato-
mists’ mind had been stripped the special-
ized organs required by real living be-
ings.” 
 
We can recognize what happens here by 
following the movement of thinking that 
produces these statements. We realize that 
this movement begins with the finished 
products, whether organs or organisms. 
This manner of thinking begins from a set 
of entities taken as given, and from there it 
can only go further “downstream,” ab-
stracting from the entities what is “com-
mon.” Thus, by comparing any one organ 
or organism with another, this manner of 
thinking looks for similarities and rejects 
differences, until one can identify one fac-
tor as present in every organ or organism 
of the set. This factor is then taken as what 
the specific individuals all have in com-
mon. The result, therefore, is unity in the 
multiplicity. 
 Thus, beginning with a set of given or-
gans or organisms A, B, C … (that organi-
cally are “finished products”), we reconsti-
tute them in the form of αA', αB', αC' …, 
where α is what is common and where A', 
B', C' … comprise all about them that is 
different. This reconstitution can be repre-
sented as follows [3]: 
We come in this way to “unity and mul-
tiplicity” by the elimination of difference. 
The result is a unity that is abstract and re-
ductive because it abridges multiplicity to 
unity and diversity to identity by finding 
the respect in which the different “entities” 
(organs or organisms) don’t differ at all but 
are the same. This is the static unity of self-
sameness, generated by a manner of move-
ment—“unity in multiplicity”—that is the 
unity of the dead end. I repeat: 
 
“Unity in Multiplicity is the static unity 
of self-sameness.” 
 
ith this movement of thinking, 
the “entities” can be anything 
whatsoever. In the early “So-
cratic” dialogues of Plato, for example, 
they are virtues. The following quotations 
are some other examples (at least in the 
form given to them by modern English 
translations). From these phrasings, one 
notes that the movement of thinking is to 
look for “unity in multiplicity”—a unity in 
which all differences are cancelled out, 
leaving only what is everywhere the same 
[4]: 
 
“What is that common quality, which is the 
same in all these cases, and which is called 
courage?” (Laches) 
 
“Isn’t it true that in every action piety is 
self-identical? … What I urged you to do 
was not to tell me about one or two of these 
many pious actions but to describe the ac-
tual feature that makes all pious actions pi-
ous. For you were in agreement, surely, 
that it is virtue of a single characteristic… 
that all pious things are pious.” (Eu-
thyphro) 
 
“We have discovered a number of virtues 
when we were looking for one only. This 
single virtue, which permeates each of 
them, we cannot find…. What is the char-
acter in respect of which they don’t differ 
at all, but are all the same?” (Meno) 
 
The idea of unity illustrated by these 
quotations is the unity of what is “com-
mon.” But the common property that con-
stitutes this unity is not separate from it but 
there in the multiplicity. The “unity in mul-
tiplicity” is part of the multiplicity of the 
given, being in fact a selection from the 
contents of the given and is, therefore, not 
in any way different or separate from the 
many individual entities (organs or organ-
isms). This is what is meant by saying that 
“unity in multiplicity” is an abstract unity. 
Yet if we look at expressions such as 
“the underlying unity beneath the diver-
sity” or “an Ideal Plan or Type that lies be-
neath the multiplicity,” we realize that the 
very form of this phrasing introduces a sep-
aration between the unity and the multi-
plicity, as if the unity had been hyposta-
sized into an abstract object itself. It is as if 
the idea of unity as what is common to 
many had “solidified” into a mental im-
pression of the common property as an ab-
stract entity and, as such, is separate from 
the multiplicity given to experience. 
This manner of understanding produces 
a “doubling” of the world—an unneces-
sary duplication that is the source of meta-
physics. The implication is always that the 
unity “behind” or “underlying” the multi-
plicity is in some way superior to, or more 
fundamental than, the multiplicity itself. In 
this way, a two-world theory develops that 
incorporates an ontological dualism: The 
unity is more real than the multiplicity 
even though it is the latter that is the more 
immediately visible. 
The most influential example is the phil-
osophical tradition of Platonism, which 
cannot by any means necessarily be identi-
fied with Plato himself in any straightfor-
ward way. In Platonism, we encounter the 
primary reality of Forms or Ideas over the 
reality of visible objects that are secondary. 
The relation of the unitary platonic arche-
type to the multiplicity of sensory ob-
jects—e.g., Beauty to the things that are 
beautiful—is referred to as “being the one 
over many.” Here, the unity is made trans-
cendent and, as Aristotle pointed out, the 
result is an unnecessary duplication of the 
world of sense objects, since, in its crude 
aspect, the reality of Forms or Ideas is 
clearly derived from the very sense world 
whose true origin the Forms or Ideas are 
then back-projected as being. 
What we recognize here is the hyposta-
tization of the “unity in multiplicity” to “a 
unity underlying multiplicity,” a situation 
of trying to “reach the milk by way of the 
cheese,” as a consequence of beginning 
from things in their finished state (the 
given) and then going farther “down-
stream” in abstraction, instead of reversing 
the movement of thinking so as to catch 
things in their coming-into-being and 
thereby ending instead of starting with “the 
given” [5]. 
 
he unity in the manifold phenome-
non appears in the form of a “law of 
nature” in science, where it also 
usually takes a mathematical form. Though 
such laws do not in fact have the form of 
“unity in multiplicity,” they are neverthe-
less most often presented and understood 
as if they did. In itself, mathematical think-
ing is intrinsically dynamical, and its mode 
of unity is very different from the static 









From the way, however, that mathematical 
thinking is seen afterward—from an 
awareness of the “finished product,” which 
sees only the results of mathematical 
thinking and not the dynamics of the think-
ing itself—it seems as if the mathematical 
laws of physics refer to what phenomena 
have in common, so that the unity in the 
phenomena that they characterize has the 
form of “unity in multiplicity.” 
Certainly, this is undeniably true of the 
way in which science is taught today. Take, 
for example, Galileo’s discovery that, for 
uniformly accelerated motion, the total dis-
tance traversed from the start of the motion 
is directly proportional to the square of 
time that has elapsed. It is simply supposed 
that, by experiment, this law was found to 
be the common factor in many instances. 
The history of science shows, however, 
that this law was not discovered in this way 
at all. In fact, the philosophy of science 
shows that it couldn’t have been discov-
ered in this way. Certainly, it can be pre-
sented afterward (beginning with the “fin-
ished product”) as if it had been, and there-
fore as if the unity in the phenomenon that 
this mathematical law represents has the 
form of “unity in multiplicity.” 
From this external point of view, it does 
seem to be the characteristic of mathemat-
ical laws of physics that they exclude the 
ways in which phenomena differ in favor 
of what they have in common. In relation 
to Galileo’s discovery just mentioned, this 
law is the same for all bodies moving with 
uniform acceleration (neglecting air re-
sistance), no matter how they differ in 
weight, size, physical nature, or chemical 
constitution; where they are on the earth 
(or anywhere else); whether or not they are 
moving; and so on. 
It is with Newton that this idea of the 
universality of science really caught hold 
of the imagination, and the idea of a unified 
science that applies to all natural phenom-
ena begins to have widespread influence, 
not only in science but in the entire West-
ern culture [6]. Newton’s first law of mo-
tion stipulates that “Every body….”—in 
other words, it is true regardless of all dif-
ferences whatsoever. In fact, the very term 
“body” in physics seems to denote a low-
est-common-denominator “thing” that has 
been stripped of all differences. 
But it was really Newton’s law of grav-
ity that captured the imagination and be-
came the very paradigm for the movement 
of thinking that finds “unity in multiplic-
ity” or “identity in diversity,” whereby the 
common factor within different phenom-
ena comes to be seen as what is “essential,” 
whereas the differences come to be seen as 
merely “superficial.” How utterly unex-
pected it was to discover that the proverbial 
apple falling from the tree, the moon orbit-
ing the earth, and the planets and comets 
circling the Sun (all of which are evidently 
so different), nevertheless have something 
in common with regard to which they don’t 
differ at all but are the same. And then to 
“discover” that this pattern applies to all 
bodies in the Universe! 
We are so accustomed to this line of 
knowledge that we not only fail to be sur-
prised but fail to notice the movement of 
thinking that it assumes. The point can be 
made by seeing this manner of understand-
ing through the eyes of someone from an-
other culture in which it has not become 
“second nature” to think in this way. One 
example is what Nobel-Laureate physicist 
T.D. Lee said when asked about his educa-
tional experiences in China before emi-
grating to America: 
 
Without hesitation, Lee replied that it was 
the concept of universality of physical laws 
that had struck him most deeply—the idea 
that physical laws applied to specific phe-
nomena here on earth, in one’s living room 
as well as on Mars, was new and compel-
ling…. [7]. 
 
n the historical development of sci-
ence, the laws of nature have not only 
been understood as being the “unity in 
multiplicity” but, more fundamentally, as 
being the unity underlying or behind the 
multiplicity. This perspective comes di-
rectly from the influence of Neoplatonism 
on the development of modern science, 
with its emphasis on the mathematical, to-
gether with the influence of the Christian 
tradition [8].  
What this means is that the mathematical 
laws of nature are conceived as separate 
from, and acting externally upon, matter in 
the manner of the two-world metaphysics 
of Platonism. In this picture, it is the math-
ematical laws that are ontologically more 
fundamental. In other words, they act on 
matter—i.e., they are not intrinsic to matter 
but impose order on what otherwise is 
chaos. 
Thus, in the fashion of metaphysical du-
alism, these mathematical laws transcend 
the world they act upon and were identified 
as being thoughts in the Mind of God, who 
was therefore conceived as a divine math-
ematician with his priest, the physicist, il-
luminating the mathematical Plan of Crea-
tion. Although this identification with God 
has now dropped out of science—notwith-
standing the tendency of some mathemati-
cal physicists from Einstein to Hawking to 
resurrect it—the dualism that it entails has 
not dropped away. 
In some ways, this dualism is even 
stronger in contemporary physics than ever 
before—for example, the fundamental 
equations of a unified field theory are 
thought by some physicists to be independ-
ent from, and ontologically prior to, the 
material universe itself. This claim often 
seems strange to laypeople who suppose 
that physicists discovered mathematical 
laws from an investigation of the intrinsic 
properties of matter itself—i.e., these laws 
are not beyond matter but essentially part 
of it. This puzzlement is reasonable, even 
though, if the laws of nature had not been 
conceived as being separate from the mat-
ter they act upon, and if the intrinsic nature 
of matter had had to be understood first, 
then more than likely modern Western sci-
ence would not have developed at all. 
Again, a comparison with the Chinese 
situation makes this point clear. In tradi-
tional Chinese culture, the belief was that 
order developed spontaneously in the 
world, out of the intrinsic character of the 
things themselves. Thus, the Chinese idea 
of law was that it was latent within things 
and not imposed from without. Hence, 
since everything had its own law, there was 
no idea of universal law in the Western 
sense. Consequently, the kind of scientific 
thinking that developed in China was very 
different from modern Western science 
[9]. 
This kind of thinking was subsequently 
extended from the physical to the organic 
sciences. The idea was to find the morpho-
logical laws of organisms, which would be 
for biology what the mathematical laws 
were for physics. The result would be biol-
ogy as a properly based science as physics 
already was. 
As suggested by the quotations I pre-
sented earlier, the kind of unity looked for 
in morphology was the “unity in multiplic-
ity” formed when the movement of think-
ing begins with the finished products. As 
I 
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in the case of physics, however, this as-
sumption did not stop at simply discover-
ing what different organs or organisms had 
in common. This “common plan” was very 
often made transcendental—i.e., as a unity 
underlying or behind the multiplicity. This 
archetype was conceived as being separate 
from the organs or organisms that it orga-
nized, like the mathematical laws of phys-
ics. This archetypal understanding could 
play the role in biology equivalent to that 
played by the laws of physics. 
 
e have already seen that Goethe 
is often associated with this 
manner of understanding. We 
will now see, however, that the movement 
of his thinking is entirely different—in 
fact, it moves in the opposite direction. To 
provide this understanding, we will follow 
the same procedure as before by looking at 
some of Goethe’s statements. Once again, 
it is a matter of following the movement of 
thinking grounding these claims [10]: 
 
“Hypothesis: All is leaf. This simplicity 
makes possible the greatest diversity.” 
 
“It has occurred to me that in the organ of 
the plant that we ordinarily designate as 
leaf the true Proteus is hidden, who can 
conceal and reveal himself in all forms. 
Forward and backward the plant is only 
leaf.” 
 
Nature “produces one part of another and 
creates the most varied forms by the modi-
fication of one single organ.” 
 
“The process by which one and the same 
organ presents itself to us in manifold 
forms has been called the metamorphosis 
of plants.” 
 
“It is a growing awareness of the Form 
with which, again and again, nature plays 
and, in playing, brings forth manifold 
life.” 
 
“The thought becomes more and more liv-
ing that it may be possible out of one form 
to develop all plant forms.” 
 
In these descriptions, we see nature 
“working and alive, striving out of the 
whole into the parts” and not just what the 
parts have in common externally. Instead 
of beginning from the “given” (the finished 
organs or organisms) and going farther 
“downstream” to abstract what is common, 
Goethe’s thinking moves “upstream” and 
“flows” down with the coming-into-being 
of the phenomenon. Consequently, he ends 
with “the given” that, in contrast, is the ar-
bitrary point of departure for modes of 
thinking assuming “multiplicity in unity.” 
This facilitation of coming-into-being is 
the dynamic thinking of the participant 
mode of consciousness instead of the static 
thinking of onlooker consciousness. What 
we see is the dynamical unity of the com-
ing-into-being instead of the static unity of 
the finished products. We could say that 
this result is the dynamic unity of the living 
source instead of the static unity of the 
dead end. 
This way of seeing turns the one and the 
many inside out. Instead of many different 
ones that are the same, we now see one that 
is becoming itself in many different ways. 
What is important to understand is that 
each of these different manifestations is the 
one itself and not another one—it is other 
but not another. 
What we have here is self-difference in-
stead of self-sameness, whereby each is the 
very same one but differently instead of 
each the different ones being the same. If 
we follow this movement of thinking, we 
begin to see in the mode of consciousness 
corresponding to this concrete idea of or-
ganic unity instead of the unity of abstrac-
tion. This shift is the important step to 
make because, otherwise, we cannot see 
the dynamical unity of self-difference. We 
do not realize how fundamentally different 
this situation is from the static unity of self-
sameness [11]. 
 
ollowing the growth of a plant in im-
agination is one accessible way to 
discover this dynamical movement 
of thinking [12]. The procedure is the same 
as in the work on color: active seeing fol-
lowed by exact sensorial imagination [13]. 
When we practice this method of looking 
and seeing, we find that we begin to expe-
rience the plant “striving out of the whole 
into the parts.” The idea of the dynamical 
unity of self-difference forms as a move-
ment in our mind as if it were the plant it-
self doing this movement. 
We now have difference within unity ra-
ther than a unity that excludes difference. 
Furthermore, this mode of “seeing” is con-
crete rather than abstract. Instead of a 
“unity in multiplicity,” we have “multiplic-
ity in unity, which is the unity of the living 
source: 
 
“Multiplicity in Unity” is the dynamical 
unity of self-difference. 
 
We must be careful here not to think of 
“multiplicity in unity” as if it implied that 
unity is divided—in which case, it would 
not be unity. This error happens if we think 
of “multiplicity in unity” in an extensive 
sense (as we would think of “unity in mul-
tiplicity”). Rather, if the unity is not to be 
divided, “multiplicity in unity” must be in-
tensive, a situation that can be understood 
via simple examples such as dividing a hol-
ogram or propagating a plant by means of 
cuttings [14]. 
For example, we can contrast holograms 
and photographs. If we cut a photograph in 
two, we have two halves with half its im-
age on each piece. When we cut a holo-
gram in two, however, we have, astonish-
ingly, two holograms with the whole image 
on both parts (though those images are 
somewhat less clear than the original im-
age). We have divided the hologram mate-
rially but, optically, it remains one. 
Clearly, there are two holograms materi-
ally but, since each is the original whole, 
there is, in some sense, one hologram only. 
We easily miss what is happening in this 
hologram example because of our in-
grained habit of thinking in terms of the 
logic of solid bodies. The arithmetic of 
wholeness is very different from the arith-
metic of bodies. This difference points to 
how we must think intensively rather than 
extensively: it’s not one and another one 
(two) but one and its own other (not two 
but one). In the intensive dimension of 
wholeness, something can be one and 
many at the same time—both same and 
other. This situation means that ontology is 
“free from the limitation of single-valued 
existence” [15]. 
Perhaps the best we can say is that each 
is the very same one and not another one, 
but this is not the best we can do because 
we can see it in the phenomenological 
sense. Comparing the hologram with a 
photograph helps to make this point in that, 
to achieve the same result photograph-
ically, we would have to make a copy of 
the original photograph and then there 
would be two because the copy is another 










his process of hologram division il-
lustrates the mode of unity that I 
call “multiplicity in unity.” The 
value of such an example is that it can form 
a template for thinking in a new way—in 
this case, helping us to think intensively in-
stead of extensively. In such cases, how-
ever, we must be careful not to confuse the 
container with the content. One way to 
avoid this difficulty is to use several differ-
ent examples. 
For example, vegetative reproduction by 
taking plant cuttings is another illustration 
that can help us to see the intensive “mul-
tiplicity in unity.” Here, again, we tend to 
miss what is happening because our cus-
tomary thinking is attuned to the external 
world of solid bodies. If we divide a fuch-
sia plant into pieces and grow them all, we 
have many new fuchsia, each separate 
from the others spatially. Organically, 
however, they belong together because 
each is the same plant. There is “inten-
sively one” plant organically, but we see 
“extensively many” plants that can be 
counted physically. 
Here, again, we have the indivisibility of 
the whole, which can be divided but re-
mains whole. No matter how many plants 
we can count, in the intensive dimension of 
wholeness there is One plant that is many 
but not many ones. What we discover here 
is that there is an intensive dimension of 
One instead of the extensive dimension of 
many ones. 
For convenience, we shall adopt the con-
vention of distinguishing the intensive One 
from the extensive one by capital and small 
letters. Thus “multiplicity in unity” is an 
intensive dimension within the One. Nei-
ther one nor many but at the same time 
both: This is the intensive dimension of 
One with the others of itself—“multiplicity 
in unity” instead of the extensive dimen-
sion of one and another one. 
Evidently, this intensive aspect cannot 
be mapped onto the bodily world; thus, we 
cannot form any sense-based mental pic-
ture of it. But we can see it in the phenom-
enological sense, though it takes practice to 
be able to do so, partly because we must set 
aside the habit of forming mental pictures 
based on the bodily world we encounter 
through the senses [16]. 
 
dmittedly, the holographic and 
plant illustrations are somewhat 
static, but they are only intended to 
help us think intensively rather than exten-
sively. If we examine Goethe’s statements 
quoted earlier, we see that they express a 
more dynamical quality. Here we see 
“multiplicity in unity” directly as the dy-
namical unity of self-difference. 
At first reading, however, we might miss 
the way that it is always the one organ or 
organism manifesting different forms of it-
self. In other words, it is always the same 
organ or organism ontologically because 
existence is not single-valued in the inten-
sive dimension of One. Some of these 
statements might be read in the extensive 
manner, in which case the differences 
would not be seen intensively as the One’s 
differences but extensively as the differ-
ence of one organ or organism from an-
other—i.e., existence is now single-valued 
so that there are many organs or organisms 
with a common factor among them. 
What Goethe means, however, by “met-
amorphosis” is this dynamical unity of 
self-difference—the intensive movement 
that produces the intensive dimension of 
One that is “multiplicity in unity.” This is 
how Goethe’s description of the inner ac-
tivity of imagination should be understood: 
 
When I closed my eyes and lowered my 
head, I could imagine a flower in the centre 
of my visual sense. Its original form never 
stayed for a moment; it unfolded and from 
within it new flowers continuously devel-
oped with coloured petals and green leaves 
[17]. 
 
What is important here is that the expe-
rience Goethe describes is intrinsically dy-
namical. It is not one plant followed by an-
other and another with a result that is an 
extensive sequence of different plants. Ra-
ther, Goethe describes One plant be-ing it-
self differently [18]. What we must do here 
is “to give up thinking in terms of beings 
that do and think instead of doings that be” 
[19]. This formative doing—the be-ing of 
the plant—is the self-producing “forming 
itself according to itself” for which Goethe 
adopted the term “entelechy.” 
Furthermore, since Goethe did not ac-
cept a purely representational theory of 
knowledge (i.e., a Cartesian/Kantian epis-
temology), we should try to avoid reading 
what he says in the light of a subject-object 
dualism. Thus the “movement that takes 
place in imagination”—i.e., the effusions 
of plants—is not merely subjective but is 
in fact the intrinsically dynamical One 
plant be-ing itself imaginally instead of 
materially. 
It is a consequence of the disciplined 
practice of imagination that the phenome-
non (in this case, the coming-into-being of 
the One plant) can form itself imagina-
tively so that what is being experienced is 
literally the self-manifesting of the phe-
nomenon itself and not just a mental repre-
sentation of it. This seems strange to us 
moderns—especially when we conven-
iently forget about the intractable difficul-
ties with a representational theory of 
knowledge. 
But hermeneutic philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer reminds us that “this in-
volvement of knowledge in being is the 
presupposition of all classical and medie-
val thought,” which is understood as 
“knowledge as an element of being itself 
and not primarily as an attitude of the sub-
ject” [20]. It is within the context of this 
hermeneutic tradition that Goethe’s fol-
lowing remarks are to be understood: 
 
Through the contemplating of an ever-cre-
ating nature, we should make ourselves 
worthy of conscious participation in her 
production. 
 
There is a delicate empiricism that makes 
itself utterly identical with the object, 
thereby becoming true theory. But this en-
hancement of our mental powers belongs 
to a highly evolved age. 
 
f we return to Goethe’s work on mor-
phology, we realize what he means 
when he suggests that the organs up a 
plant’s stem can be perceived in the mode 
of  One organ’s metamorphosing into dif-
ferent modes of itself, whereupon the visi-
ble sequence of organs can then be seen as 
a whole movement of which these organs 
are simply “snapshots.” There is a reversal 
of perception in this way of seeing: The 
movement is not made out of the sequence 
of organs, but the organs are “made out of” 
the movement—for example, physicist 
David Bohm’s holomovement, which he 
described as “undivided wholeness in 
flowing movement” [21]. 
What is perhaps most important to em-
phasize here is the way this manner of see-
ing illustrates the true phenomenological 
character of Goethe’s way of science. We 
see the discrete particulars and their intrin-










this case, the necessary connection is dy-
namical: It is the whole movement, of 
which the individual organs now appear as 
arrested stages. There is a single form, but 
it is not what the particular organs have in 
common and it is not what is “behind” the 
appearances. Rather, it is the unity that is 
the whole movement whereby the single 
form is not static but dynamical. A com-
mon form could not generate the move-
ment, whereas here it is the movement that 
generates particular forms. As Brady 
writes, 
 
Thus the movement is not itself a product 
of the forms from which it is detected, but 
rather the unity of those forms, from which 
unity, any form belonging to the series can 
be generated [23]. 
 
Furthermore, we can now see why any 
form belonging to the series (whether of 
leaves only or all organs up the stem) can 
be taken as representing all others in the se-
ries. Each part is a manifestation of the 
whole (“striving out of the whole into the 
parts”) so that each member of the series is 
the One organ metamorphosing into differ-
ent modes of itself. Thus, any organ of the 
series can function as a concrete symbol 
for all others, and the entire series incorpo-
rates a dynamical unity of self-difference 
that generates an intensive dimension of 
One. 
This is what Goethe meant when he said 
that “All is leaf.” Because of the habit of 
thinking in the mode of “unity in multiplic-
ity,” this statement is usually interpreted as 
implying somehow a common plan, with 
the term “leaf” referring to a kind of gen-
eralized image formed by abstraction. If re-
ally engaged with Goethe’s meaning, how-
ever, we realize that this interpretation is 
like trying to fit a square peg into a round 
hole. 
The reason for this dissonance is now 
clear: Goethe thinks of the organs, not as a 
set of finished products to be compared 
but, rather, as a “coming-into-being” series 
produced by the One organ metamorphos-
ing into different modes of itself. The re-
sult is that any one mode of this organ can 
function as a concrete symbol representing 
the entire series thus generated. Alter-
nately, we may say that this diversely met-
amorphosed organ has no name and moves 
through the series in both directions (e.g., 
a stamen is a contracted leaf; or a leaf, an 
expanded stamen). Whichever way, what 
is important is the dynamical wholeness of 
the series of organs and not what members 
of the series have in common. 
 
he difference between the concrete 
dynamical wholeness of the series 
and the abstract common factor of a 
set was recognized very early on by philos-
opher Ernst Cassirer. He saw that, although 
universal concepts were traditionally (i.e., 
in the empirical tradition) supposed to be 
formed by the abstraction of a common 
factor, this widely held view was intrinsi-
cally contradictory because it presupposed 
the very concepts the origins of which it 
sought to explain. 
Cassirer recognized that, more funda-
mentally, concepts in mathematics and 
mathematical science took the form of a se-
ries rather than a common factor. Once the 
general principle is known, then far from 
eliminating differences, it is possible to 
generate all the different possibilities. In 
other words, the particular cases in their 
concrete totality can be evolved from the 
concept so that the concept can be said to 
include diversity within itself. In short, the 
concept is a concrete universal instead of 
the abstract universal of the empirical tra-
dition [24]. 
Although Cassirer does not mention 
Goethe directly, it is nevertheless clear that 
what he says about the form of universal 
concepts is very much in accord with the 
way that Goethe understood the dynamical 
wholeness of the organism. As Gerry Web-
ster and Brian Goodwin explain, “Cassi-
rer’s important concept of ‘serial form’ 
seems to have been anticipated, if only in-
tuitively, informally, and obscuring, by 
Goethe in his ‘Theory of Metamorphosis’” 
[25]. Webster and Goodwin draw on phi-
losopher Ron Brady‘s work to show how 
Goethe’s transformation series of organs is 
of a similar kind to Cassirer’s concept of 
serial form [26]. 
Though they discuss this link between 
Goethe and Cassirer, Webster and Good-
win also indicate how the two thinkers dif-
fer in that Cassirer ultimately assumed a 
representational theory of understanding 
that separates being and knowledge into 
different domains, with the latter restricted 
to the domain of cognitive representation. 
Consequently, Webster and Goodwin see 
Goethe’s phenomenology of organic form 
as emphasizing only “the epistemic order, 
the forms of thought in terms of which be-
ing is represented or described—the struc-
ture of a set of concepts or propositions—
and not to the forms of being per se, the 
ontological order” [27]. 
To some extent, the tendency to depend 
on a representational theory of knowledge 
is itself a consequence of failing to incor-
porate a dynamical mode of consciousness 
in scientific thinking. The reductive result 
is that thinking remains in the onlooker 
mode of consciousness and consequently 
too closely tied to things in their finished 
state. As a result, the question of 
knowledge becomes that of how we can 
know things that have already become with 
the result that the subject-object dualism of 
representational theory seems quite “natu-
ral.” 
In contrast, a dynamical mode of con-
sciousness invokes a participation in 
“thinking the coming-into-being of things” 
and encountering generatively what other-
wise we would only know as a completed 
product. In Goethe’s manner of seeing, the 
coming-into-being of the phenomenon 
forms itself in thinking so that the dynam-
ical mode of understanding is no longer di-
vorced from the phenomenon. Knowledge 
is no longer apart from being because 
knowledge is the phenomenon be-ing itself 
through thinking. Understanding becomes 
a part of being itself.  
 
Notes 
1. For example, Holdrege 1998; Riegner 1993, 
1998, 2008; Schad 2018. 
2. No citations are provided for these quotations. 
3. Bortoft explains that, in this diagram, he adapts 
a notation used by Ernst Cassirer in Substance and 
Form (Cassirer 1980). 
4. No citations are provided for these quotations. 
5. There can be no transcendence without imma-
nence, or immanence without transcendence because 
each is the condition of possibility for the other. There 
is duality here but no dualism—no dichotomy as there 
is in the two-world theory, where each world is mutu-
ally external to the other. The difficulty arises from 
the counterfeit transcendence, which has the quality 
of externality and is therefore conceived as being sep-
arate from and outside the sense world, and hence as 
another “world” (see Miller 2005, esp. pp. 120–21). 
Significantly, Plato was not a Platonist—he did not 
subscribe to the two-world theory that is central to the 
Western metaphysical tradition. In view of this, we 
should perhaps refer to the Neoplatonic tradition, es-
pecially as it influenced the development of modern 
science from the Renaissance onward, as “pseudo-
Platonism” (See Bortoft 2012, pp. 158–59, pp. 183–
86). 
6. This idea of a unified science is the source of the 
Enlightenment idea of universality in human nature 
and the belief in universal reason that can discover 
T 
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universal principles in morality, politics, and religion, 
as well as in science. 
7. Prigogine and Stengers 1984, p. 64. The impli-
cation here is not that Chinese culture is somehow de-
ficient. Rather, comparative studies illustrate that 
Chinese culture emphasizes aspects of phenomena 
different from those emphasized in modern Western 
culture, most notably giving priority to the uniquely 
particular rather than the underling unity. This differ-
ence means that the Chinese culture developed a 
mode of perception that we Westerners tend to lack, 
just as our Western culture has developed some 
modes of understanding not traditionally found in 
Chinese culture. 
8. And, subsequently, the emergence of the Nation 
State, with its transition from common law to statute 
law. For further discussion, see Bortoft 1996, Part III. 
9. See Needleman, 1976. 
10. No citations are provided for these quotations. 
In his last entry of this list, Bortoft quotes Rudolf Stei-
ner (1963), who wrote that Goethe “seeks to bring the 
diversity back into the unity from which it originally 
went forth.” 
11. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “You know 
that you’ve seen it when you feel that your seeing has 
been turned inside out.” 
12. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “I have 
found a Busy Lizzie plant very helpful.” 
13. Bortoft discusses active seeing and sensorial 
imagination in Part II of this series (see EAP, win-
ter/spring 2019). 
14. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “As simple 
as these examples are, it helps to think doing them in 
imagination instead of only thinking of the result.” 
15. Bortoft attributes this quotation to philosopher 
J.G. Bennett but does not provide a citation. On 
Bortoft’s relationship with Bennett, see the first part 
of this series (EAP, summer/fall 2018). 
16. The intensive dimension of One is no stranger 
than many of the “difficulties” we face in quantum 
physics—think, for example, of the interference ex-
periment with a single photon. The fact that we cannot 
map the intensive dimension of the One into a sensory 
representation does not mean that it is an abstraction. 
On the contrary, “multiplicity in unity” is a concrete 
unity, even though it cannot be recognized sensorily 
or caught in the logic of solid bodies. It is “unity in 
multiplicity” that is abstract. 
For further discussion of the hologram, see Bortoft 
1996, pp. 4–13. 
17. No citation is provided for this quotation. 
18. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “A some-
what more static (because non-living) “model” is il-
lustrated by the construction of a multiple hologram, 
which lacks the intrinsically dynamical character of 
living being but does nevertheless demonstrate the 
notion of ‘multiplicity in unity’ in a way that imitates 
artificially the dynamical wholeness of living being—
see Bortoft 1996, Part 2, note 58. 
19. Bennett 1977, p. 64. 
20. No citation is given for this quotation. For fur-
ther discussion of Gadamer, see Bortoft 2012, pp. 
121–26. 
21. Bortoft discusses Bohm’s work in Part I of this 
series (EAP, summer/fall 2018); also see Bortoft 
1996, pp. 283–89; Brady 1998. 
22. Bortoft 1996, pp. 303–20. 
23. No citation is given for this quotation; either 
Brady 1987 or 1998? 
24. This remarkably valuable insight is discussed 
in some detail in Cassirer’s early Substance and 
Function (Cassirer 1980). Although he does not ex-
plicitly consider the idea of a different mode of unity 
(so that he does not consider the generative serial con-
cept [as distinct from the abstract generic concept] in 
terms of the of the metamorphosis of One into differ-
ent modes of itself (i.e., producing an intensive di-
mension of One), Still, it is clear (even when not made 
explicit) that the movement of Cassirer’s thinking is 
away from entities in their finished state toward their 
coming-into-being. His thinking becomes dynamical. 
If one reads what he writes carefully, it becomes clear 
from the language he uses that sometimes he moves 
toward one mode in his thinking and, at other times, 
moves toward the other, sometimes getting caught 
more in the product (e.g., “the unification of multi-
plicity”) and, at other times, becoming free from this 
static sense and moving toward the processual (e.g., 
“we have to create this multiplicity”). 
25. Webster and Goodwin 1996, p. 110. 
26. Brady 1998. 
27. Webster and Goodwin 1996, p. 101. 
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Bortoft Lectures on-line 
Writer Simon Robinson has up-
loaded on YouTube several lectures 
that Henri Bortoft presented on 
wholeness at Schumacher College in 
the 2000s. These lectures are an ex-
cellent introduction to Bortoft’s 
thinking, including his understanding 
of Goethean science. The links are 
below.  
    There is also available a tape re-
cording of Bortoft’s presentation at 
the 2011 J. G. Bennett’s Dramatic 
Universe conference; this link is 
listed below after the Schumacher 
links. Note that, in the early 1960s, 
Bortoft was a researcher under the 
direction of Bennett. 
 




Lecture 2, Part I: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=1&v=1Tzx5EOWHe0 











Lecture 4, Part II: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
aCywGtSeWi4 
Lecture 4, Part III: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=2&v=thMjGQzhEN0 
Lecture 5, Part I: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I
LVxvP_S9zI 
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 place is a point of interrela-
tions in space and time, as phi-
losopher Martin Heidegger il-
lustrates in Building, Dwelling, 
Thinking, using the example of a bridge 
(Heidegger 1971). This bridge is built be-
tween two previously unconnected 
riverbanks. Once the bridge is there, it acts 
as a passage and leads people from one 
side to the other. 
The bridge, however, also gathers peo-
ple to this location: People come because 
there are other people and opportunities for 
trade—providing food, wares, and provi-
sions for travelers. Over time, a town may 
emerge on one or both of these riverbanks. 
A place is created.  
Heidegger’s Dasein (being there, in 
place) is often assumed to imply fixity and 
stasis as opposed to becoming, which in-
volves progress. I would argue, however, 
that this inertial emphasis is at odds with 
the interactive creation of places through 
building, cultivating, and gathering. The 
building of the bridge does not 
create a bounded place consisting 
only of the pillars and archway of 
the bridge itself but opens up the 
banks of the river joining the 
places on each side and gathering 
to itself its own specific locale. 
Cultivation (another form of 
building) is an opening up of the 
world to its potential. Place as an 
event can never be static; place as 
interrelations cannot be bounded 
or fixed. In gathering, places are 
productive of everyday life. 
Anthropologist Tim Ingold 
(2008) describes how life flows: 
movement and action are at the 
center of everyday life. Places are 
(merely) pauses in the flows where 
lives become entangled, as at the bridge. 
Place and people are thus inseparable in 
terms of their mutual history and biog-
raphy. 
One of the problems of researching 
place, partly because of this integration 
into the whole of life, is that it can be hard 
to see. Because places are not specific 
points on the globe or necessarily defined 
by objects, built or natural, they can be in-
visible. The place of an annual carnival 
will only manifest itself during the period 
of the event and will be another place the 
rest of the year. 
While the objects in a place can be ob-
served, just as the people can be, the view-
point of the observer, especially if an out-
sider, may well miss what is there for lo-
cals—for example, the street corner where 
men gather to talk and smoke. Like people, 
places can have multiple identities simul-
taneously. People whose lives are thus en-
tangled incorporate aspects of the place, 
the history of the place, into their everyday 
lives—their dasein, “way of being,” or 
“belonging.”  
Research into daily lives in Wigan, a 
large town in northwest England, shows 
how mundane, everyday sites gather and 
become eventful. Participants kept photo 
diaries for a week detailing the places they 
visited. During post-diary discussions, 
these participants talked about the places 
depicted in the photos. Three examples 
serve to illustrate, first, that the places most 
important in our lives may be the most or-
dinary and overlooked; second, that places 
have biographies that connect us to our 
past and our future; and, third, that all 
places are necessarily locally-specific. 
 
The mundane place 
During our post-diary discussion, Janet’s 
photos helped her to think about connec-
tions in her life that would usually be con-
sidered too mundane for discussion. In her 
diary, Janet, age 52, included this Spar pet-
rol station (photo, below) as one of the 
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places to which she is most attached. This 
attachment is through a friend, who she has 
known for over 30 years. When she under-
takes the ordinary task of buying petrol for 
her car, Janet also visits this friend who 
works in the garage:  
 
That’s the garage, that’s there because I 
go a lot and one of the assistants I’ve 
known for, how long have I known [her]? 
I’ve probably known her 30 years! ... then 
her children and my children and you 
know. I’ve been going to that garage since 
I passed my driving test. 
 
It is through “un-thought-about” connec-
tions to places like this petrol station that a 
deep-seated belonging to place can be ex-
plored. Here, worlds of past and future are 
invoked due to the implicit continuation of 
the relationship: “I go a lot.” Janet and her 
friend are fully immersed in the place 
through their ongoing relationship that is 
part of the rhythm of their everyday lives. 
This garage has a function paralleling 
Heidegger’s bridge in that it implicitly 
connects people and place through provid-
ing fuel for transport and enabling a road 
network. The garage gathers. 
 
Storytelling places 
Places also gather memories, an important 
part of a person’s identity. A place “re-
members” through retaining traces of pre-
vious buildings, but people also remember 
through places. Memories are fluid images 
open to reinterpretation, creating a dia-
logue between past and present—a narra-
tive where people, place, and culture are all 
part of the story. In “placing” people 
(“Who are you?”) we ask them to tell us a 
story of their lives—the past and perhaps 
the future.  
Aged 65, Val has lived in or close to 
Leigh (a part of the local government area 
of Wigan) all her life. At her post-diary in-
terview, she said this about the photo of 
Bradshawgate in Leigh (photo, above): 
 
Leigh looks funny when you take its photo-
graph. You’d think, My God, if you’d gone 
for a day out you’d think let’s go some-
where else, but you don’t see it really. This 
big red building [center left] used to be the 
Co-op and both my parents worked for the 
Co-op, not this one but you know the whole 
Co-op movement and that’s how they met 
[1]. Yes, it isn’t beautiful, but it’s the peo-
ple—the people are very nice, they’re very 
friendly, it’s got a sense of community, 
we’re very lucky. 
 
As intimated by this response, Leigh gen-
erally slips into the background of Val’s 
consciousness, but her looking at this 
photo brings Leigh to her notice, this unu-
sual perspective making this place look 
“funny,” or odd. 
The physical aspect of place is crucial 
here because “the materiality of objects 
embodies the past experiences and rela-
tionships that [people] have been part of 
and facilitates some kind of ineffable con-
tact with those experiences and relation-
ships” (Jones 2010, p. 189). Through re-
membering the building as the Co-op, Val 
keeps both the memory of her parents alive 
and the memories connected with the 
building itself. Places are inalienable for 
those who have inhabited them previously, 
including our past selves. 
In her interview, Val was able to tell me 
the history of most of the buildings in this 
and other photos—for example, the loca-
tions of former cinemas or the shop where 
she bought a pram for her children. There 
are personal connections to these places 
and, at the same time, she is telling me the 
history of Leigh as a place through her own 
biography. This history is related through 
personal stories linked to the wider world. 
Here everyday life as “flow” (Ingold 2008) 
moves between past and present. It is per-
haps only through realizing places as ob-
jects, created here through the camera lens, 
that we can “see” how places impact on our 
daily lives. 
 
The local and the global 
Perhaps, ironically, it is the advance of the 
global that has indeed brought the local 
back into focus. The global and the local 
are positioned as opposing concepts: The 
global is disembodied, powerful, and pro-
gressive; the local is physical, weak, and 
static. In fact, “the global” exists only in 
rhetoric, not in reality. 
There is no place that is global or, rather, 
all places are connected globally. Nothing 
ca be abstracted from the physicality of a 
local place: A global business may have 
manufacturing plants in different coun-
tries, but each employs local people and 
contributes to, and is affected by, a local 
way of life, a local culture. 
Val related how she looked after her 
grandchildren while their parents worked 
and regularly took them to McDonald’s as 
a treat. During the week of her diary en-
tries, she and her youngest granddaughter 
went there (photo, next page):  
 
Val: McDonalds… that’s the one we go to. 
Me: It could be anywhere, I know a 
McDonald’s that looks exactly like 
that.  
Val: That’s right, this is the 13b, you know, 
plan 13b if you’ve got so many square 
yards. Well, we used to pick the boys 
up from nursery, that’s right so we’d 
have [our granddaughter] and … 
that was the nearest place, really, so 
we’d come back and go there, so we 
got to know the people in there, they 
liked going there for their lunch… so 
at one time we were going every 
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week. Now we go occasionally, be-
cause the children just love McDon-
alds and they do a nice cup of coffee 
these days …  
Me: So you actually got to know the staff 
in there did you, they don’t have such 
a quick turnover? 
Val: Yes. In fact, we took [the youngest 
granddaughter] in the other week… 
the girl who used to wipe the tables 
down… she used to come and say 
“hello, little chickadees” to the chil-
dren and blow me she came and said, 
“Oh you’ve got another little chicka-
dee….” 
 
Through multiple visits, Val has created 
a “global” space as part of her life-story 
and that of her grandchildren. Because the 
same woman still works in this particular 
local place, we see how it gathers local 
people in the same way as the garage men-
tioned by Janet. Although McDonald’s is 
built to standard patterns (here the “13b”), 
inside it becomes a part of this particular 
local place. 
Augé (1995) refers to places as “thick” 
or “thin.” His descriptions imply that there 
are fewer sociologically interesting rela-
tions in a “thin” or “non-place” than in a 
“thick” or “anthropological” place. This 
contrast is misleading, however, because, 
as my three real-world examples illustrate, 
all places are the locus of multiple interac-
tions happening only at that location and in 
turn producing new effects. Places are not 
“self-contained,” and no place is bounded. 
When traced from beginning to end, social 
connections flow through many different 
places, each of which is a local place for 
that particular interaction, gathering to it 
the local landscape. 
 
Conclusion 
Beginning from Heidegger’s 
premise that places gather (1971), 
I have attempted to show how lo-
cal places draw together stories 
and memories that help to consti-
tute “places” in the wider sense of 
a setting for daily life. Constituted 
through mundane tasks, places are 
where daily life takes place. Each 
place becomes what it is through 
interactions with other people and 
with the landscape and with other 
places, over time. Place and peo-
ple are inseparable in terms of bi-
ography and mutual history. 
A place is not static and un-
changing but a part of life, con-
stantly evolving and becoming. 
As part of being human, people create 
places that are located and local but also a 
part of wider social relations around the 
world and through time. 
 
Note 
1. “Co-op” is the common form for the Co-operative 
movement that gives members a share of the profits. 
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n my previous essay, I described a 
three-day trip that my sister Trish and 
I took into Wollemi canyon country 
west of Sydney. This excursion led 
me to explore the ways in which the expe-
rience of entering a canyon was akin to go-
ing inside one’s self. I investigated the 
body’s interior spaces and the subjective 
sense of inner spatiality before proceeding 
to maps of interiority provided by Eastern 
spirituality and Western psychology. 
The matter of how human interiority is 
related to the form and character of the 
landscape has been considered by several 
important thinkers and writers. In this es-
say, I consider some of their work, begin-
ning with English poet Gerard Manley 
Hopkins.  
 
Inscape and poetic vision 
Hopkin’s poetry provides a superb exam-
ple of the expression of an internalized 
landscape. In his prose writings, Hopkins 
provides insights into his poetic vision and 
adds to the vocabulary of interiority. His 
poems are distinctive for their utterly orig-
inal syntax and rhythm. Struck by the 
beauty of the world, he strove to express 
how it moved him, passionately and spirit-
ually. In “the Windhover,” his ecstasy in 
beholding the morning flight of a falcon 
trembles on the page: 
 
I caught this morning morning’s minion, 
king- 
 dom of daylight’s dauphin, dapple-
dawn-drawn Falcon, in his riding 
 Of the rolling level underneath him 
steady air, and striding 
High there, how he rung upon the rein of a 
wimpling wing 
In his ecstasy! Then off, off forth on swing, 
 As a skate’s heel sweeps smooth on a 
bow-bend: the hurl and gliding 
 Rebuffed the big wind. My heart in 
hiding 
Stirred for a bird,—the achieve of, the mas-
tery of the thing! [1] 
 
To Hopkins, the delicate and surprising 
uniqueness of each natural form revealed 
an underlying, unifying principle. In his 
journals, he coined the words inscape and 
instress to describe the relationship be-
tween inner and outer worlds thus dis-
closed. In the view of the editor of the Pen-
guin edition of Hopkins’ work, W.H. Gard-
ner: 
 
As a name for that “individually-distinc-
tive” form (made up of various sense-data) 
which constitutes the rich and revealing 
“one-ness” of the natural object, he coined 
the term inscape; and for that energy of be-
ing by which all things are upheld, for that 
natural (but ultimately supernatural) 
stress which determines an inscape and 
keeps it in being—for that he coined the 
name instress [2]. 
 
Importantly, instress is not simply an in-
ternal cohesive force but can also refer to 
the force within a natural object that acts 
on the senses and actualizes the inscape 
within the mind of the human perceiver. It 
is thus a sort of direct illumination from na-
ture. 
Notes about the inscape appear in Hop-
kins’ journal in 1868 when he was 24 and 
continue until his journal ends seven years 
later. He describes the fluting of a branch 
of Switzerland’s Grindelwald glacier as 
“swerved and inscaped strictly to the mo-
tion of the mass” [3]. Later, he writes: 
“Note that a slender race of fine flue cloud 
inscaped in continuous eyebrow curves 
hitched on the Weisshorn peak as it 
passed” [4]. Back in England in spring-
time, he observed:  
 
This is the time to study inscape in the 
spraying of trees, for the swelling of buds 
carry them to a pitch which the eye could 
not else gather… in these sprays at all 
events there is a new world of inscape [5].  
 
While out walking in winter grassland, 
he describes how he sees “the inscape 
though freshly, as if my eye were still 
growing, though with a companion the eye 
and the ear are for the most part shut and 
instress cannot come” [6]. Occasionally, 
he refers to the inscaping of a human-made 
structure. While in a ruined castle, he 
notes: “standing before the gateway I had 
an instress which only the true old work 
gives from the strong and noble inscape of 
the pointed arch” [7]. 
Even this selection does not cover the 
subtle and elusive ways in which Hopkins 
employs the term inscape. For example, in 
his journal entry of March 12, 1870, he 
writes: “If you look at the rest of the sunset 
you must cover the sun, but today I in-
scaped them together and made the sun the 
true eye and ace of the whole… it is indeed 
by stalling it that it falls into scape with the 
sky” [8]. Here, the perceiver is taking an 
active role, and Hopkins uses inscape as a 
verb (“I inscaped them together”) rather 
than being acted upon by phenomena in na-
ture. 
In Gardner’s view, inscape was the heart 
and vital point of Hopkins’ poetry: “For 
Hopkins, poetic creation occurred when 
the poet’s own nature (his own inscape) 
has been instressed by some complemen-
tary inscape discovered in external Nature. 
The resulting poem is therefore a new in-
scape” [9]. 
This is an arresting idea and pertinent to 
the study of interiority. For Hopkins, inner-
ness in a natural form is not something that 
is directly apprehended but appears in the 
mind of the perceiver through the power 
inherent in the complementarity of in-
scapes. 
This process raises as many questions as 
it answers. Presumably, each of us has his 
I 
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or her own nature and a particular in-
scape—certain qualities that predispose us 
to respond to certain inscapes in “external 
Nature” rather than others. How is a per-
son’s inscape developed through life, and 
what role does previous contact with na-
ture play in the forming of that inscape? 
It is noteworthy that the initiating 
force—the agency—can reside in either 
the perceiver or the natural form. Hopkins 
writes both of how he inscaped certain 
forms together, and how other inscapes in-
stressed themselves in his mind. What is 
this force that enables the inscapes of nat-
ural forms to impress themselves on the 
human psyche? Some clue may be found in 
the fact that, while training for the Jesuit 
order, Hopkins encountered the writings of 
the Dutch theologian Duns Scotus, who 
held that the real value of a physical thing 
lay in its specific form that revealed its 
“Thisness” (haecceitas)—its individual-
ized perfection that made it this and not 
that. Hopkins felt that Scotus’ philosophy 
corroborated his theory of inscape and in-
stress. 
There is also great sympathy between 
Hopkins’ inscape and Goethe’s idea of the 
gesture of a natural phenomenon, though 
there is no evidence that Hopkins knew of 
Goethe’s way of science. Both are indwell-
ing within the phenomenon and, though in-
scapes and gestures are revealed through 
natural forms, they are not directly percep-
tible. 
For Goethe it was a science, systemati-
cally applied by disciplined use of sensory 
data and trained intuition. For Hopkins, it 
seemed more a matter of opening himself 
to the natural world and to moments of pri-
vate illumination when inscaping revealed 
itself. Hopkins places more emphasis on 
being acted upon, being instressed by the 
inscape of a bluebell, an oak, cloud, or 
glacier. In contrast, Goethe is actively en-
gaged with his subject of interest, observ-
ing and repeatedly sketching, looking for 
that essence, the gesture. 
These contrasting ways of seeing are a 
difference of degree rather than kind. Hop-
kins is active in the sense of being actively 
receptive, praying and closely observing 
the natural forms that surround him. Goe-
the is also receptive—the gesture can re-
veal itself in the psyche of the researcher, 
through poetic image as well as careful re-
petitive drawing. 
In my experience, the more one opens 
oneself to a natural phenomenon, the 
harder it is to tell whether one is initiating 
action or being acted upon, and indeed 
both are happening simultaneously. Living 
in Tasmania, I’ve long been aware that as I 
bring about physical changes on the land 
by planting native trees and grasses, and 
removing some introduced plants, I am be-
ing changed physically in my musculature 
and posture. The inner aspects of this pro-
cess include the feeling that how I am in 
the world, my inscape, is changing in re-
sponse to the land and its soundscape. For 
its part, the land seems less disturbed than 
when I first arrived, and has become, in the 
words of an Aboriginal friend who visited 
not so long ago, “quieter now.” Particu-
larly in recognizing the “this-ness” of 
shoreline rocks and mountains, I’ve had 
glimpses of Hopkins-like illuminations 
 
A Literary view 
Some place writers have also ventured into 
this theme of interiority, starting with the 
author who pioneered 19th-century West-
ern environmental thought, Henry David 
Thoreau. In his essay Walking (best known 
for the aphorism “in wildness is the preser-
vation of the world”), he proposed that the 
quality of a person’s thoughts and attitudes 
is directly influenced by the terrain in 
which they walk: 
 
For I believe that climate does thus react 
on man—as there is something in the 
mountain air that feeds the spirit and in-
spires. Will not man grow to greater per-
fection intellectually and physically under 
these influences? Or is it unimportant how 
many foggy days there are in his life? I 
trust that we shall be more imaginative, 
that our thoughts will be clearer, fresher 
and more ethereal, as our sky—our under-
standing more comprehensive and 
broader, like our plains—our intellect gen-
erally on a grander scale, like our thunder 
and lightning, our rivers and mountains 
and forests—and our hearts shall even cor-
respond in breadth and depth and gran-
deur to our inland seas [10]. 
 
For Thoreau, the key dynamic is be-
tween wild nature and tame civilization. 
The wildness of nature gives rise to wild 
literature, which is free, swift, and beauti-
ful compared with the dullness of civilized 
scholarship. If attended to, there is sympa-
thy between the outer and inner world—a 
“subtle magnetism” in nature that directs 
our steps when setting out on a walk and 
similarly directs our minds. 
In turn, contemporary American writer 
Barry Lopez writes of “two landscapes—
one outside the self, the other within” [11]. 
Lopez argues that the external, physical 
landscape is best understood as a series of 
purposeful, ordered relationships between 
objective phenomena such as rock se-
quences and humidity levels or more inef-
fable observations such as the quality of 
winter light. In relation to the interior, psy-
chological landscape, he writes: 
 
The second landscape I think of is an inte-
rior one, a kind of projection within a per-
son of a part of the exterior landscape…. 
The speculations, intuitions and formal 
ideas we refer to as “mind” are a set of re-
lationships within the interior landscape 
with purpose and order; some of these are 
obvious, many impenetrably subtle. The 
shape and character of these relationships 
in a person’s thinking, I believe, are deeply 
influenced by where on this earth one goes, 
what one touches, the patterns one ob-
serves in nature—the intricate history of 
one’s life in the land… These thoughts are 
arranged, further, according to the thread 
of one’s moral, intellectual and spiritual 
development. The interior landscape re-
sponds to the character and subtlety of an 
exterior landscape; the shape of the indi-
vidual mind is affected by land as it is by 
genes [12]. 
 
Lopez’s words are a careful elaboration 
of Thoreau’s rhetorical flourish. Subtle and 
complex, they need careful consideration. 
Lopez describes how one set of intricate re-
lationships—the outer ecology of land-
scape— influences another equally intri-
cate set of relationships—the inner ecol-
ogy of mindscape. 
From his perspective, it is entirely un-
derstandable that I would have the idea 
about the interconnected interiority of per-
son and world after the canyon experience. 
It is evidence of the deep influence of the 
exterior landscape on my thinking. 
Moreover, Lopez suggests that there is 
not a simple, one-to-one connection be-
tween the qualities of the land where one is 
and the manner of thoughts one has. This 
is not a causal relationship. The structure 
and qualities of the canyons did not cause 
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me to have the idea about interiority. An-
other person, with a different life in the 
land and different predilections, might 
have had quite a divergent experience. 
A further implication is that this relation-
ship is not fixed, either by some sort of ge-
ographical determinism or by one’s child-
hood experiences, important as they may 
be. As adults, our place history continues 
to mature, the threads of our moral and 
spiritual development weave a more com-
plex pattern, and our intentions toward the 
places we inhabit may change. In these 
ways, the connections between the two 
landscapes continue to evolve throughout 
our lives. In my years of working with hun-
dreds of mature-aged, postgraduate stu-
dents, I noticed that the older the students 
were, the more important place relation-
ships became for them.  
Lopez’s outer and inner landscapes help 
illuminate some of the questions posed by 
Hopkins’ work as well as identify points of 
contrast. The predispositions of one’s own 
inscape implied in Hopkins’ writing are 
not so much an inborn characteristic of our 
psyche, Lopez would say, but are strongly 
influenced by the qualities of the land that 
has held our attention. To which I would 
add: “particularly in childhood.” 
Children are generally more impression-
able and their minds are more malleable 
than adults’. Girls and boys are not only 
learning about the world; they are learning 
how to think about the world. After the age 
of seven or eight, children can form deep 
attachments to particular places as refuges 
or sites of exploration, play, secrecy, and 
sanctuary. 
Childhood sense of place can exert a 
lasting influence on our responses to places 
as an adult [13]. The power that inheres in 
the resonance between an inscaped form in 
nature and one’s own inscape comes from 
our life in the land as refracted through the 
patterns of our personal development. 
Hopkins’ inscape is more multi-layered 
than Lopez’s two landscapes. It was devel-
oped progressively over seven years of 
journal entries and poetry writing rather 
than being the subject of one essay. Hop-
kins’ account is more nuanced in the ques-
tion of originating force, whereas Lopez is 
primarily concerned with the way the land 
influences the mind. 
Lopez does not, however, propose a sim-
ple causal relationship, and the effect the 
land has on one’s inner landscape is 
strongly mediated by one’s character and 
personal history. I suspect the differences 
are partly attributable to the nature of the 
medium in which the two authors express 
themselves. Hopkins the poet draws on ar-
resting juxtapositions of images and new 
rhythms and syntax to convey the moment 
of illumination, while Lopez the essayist 
uses a careful accretion of ideas laid down 
in a well-ordered sequence like sedimen-
tary strata. 
One should also emphasize that Lopez’s 
inner landscape refers entirely to a per-
son’s thinking. This inner landscape does 
not encompass embodied interiority—the 
physical sense of the interior of the body 
that is central to my inquiry. Nevertheless, 
his understanding of one’s mental world as 
a response to her place history is an im-
portant part of the picture. Hopkins’ in-
scape involves the psyche—the way our 
own inscape is structured and our receptiv-
ity to inscape in the natural world. It is 
more to do with a felt response to the 
world, often after perceiving several com-
plementary natural forms. 
 
The two landscapes 
An exploration of the relationship between 
the two landscapes, if one were to take 
Lopez’s words seriously, would involve a 
detailed exposition of my “life in the land,” 
drawing out the threads of my intellectual 
and spiritual development, a type of “mind 
and place autobiography.” 
This is a far larger undertaking than is 
possible in this essay, but the immediate 
memories and associations that the phrase 
calls up—as a ten-year-old climbing as 
high as I dared in the pine tree opposite our 
house to listen for the voice of God in the 
wind, being mocked by schoolmates for 
seeking mystical experiences on mountain-
tops—suggest that such an autobiograph-
ical effort would be worth the effort, de-
spite the abundant opportunities for self-
serving or self-deluded narratives. 
One other event from my past has bear-
ing on this matter, particularly as it relates 
to the work of poet and writer Rainer Maria 
Rilke, who also pondered the outside/in-
side relationship [14]: 
 
The inner—what is it? 
If not intensified sky, 
hurled through with birds and deep 
with the winds of homecoming 
 
I, too, have seen the sky intensified and 
hurled through with birds. One day in wild 
weather, I heard the wild mewing and cry-
ing that announces a gathering of kelp 
gulls. In the strong updraft at the break in 
slope, 40 or more ascended, wheeling 
about in widening circles, one above the 
other as if traversing the interior of a vast, 
invisible cone. I stood near the vortex of 
wailing voices and gazed upward. The sun 
blazed through a gap in the storm clouds, 
illuminating the birds. 
The wings of kelp gulls are black on the 
dorsal side and white on the ventral side so 
that, for half the circle, they were almost 
indistinguishable against the dark sky un-
til, with a burst of light, the sun caught their 
alabaster undersides in brilliant contrast 
with the thundercloud. Standing at the 
apex, I felt this avian vortex to extend deep 
into my interior. It was one of the strongest 
experiences of sky-like interiority I have 
had. The sky was turning in on itself. Its 
avian inhabitants animated the whole 
space, including mine [15]. 
These writers’ accounts illuminate the 
experiences of my three days in the Wol-
lemi. My encounters reflect a complex and 
on-going co-evolution of ideas and place 
experiences. An “intricate history” predis-
posed me to respond so strongly to the can-
yonlands, and this response continues to 
resound within me.  
 
Place/self interiority 
Could it be that, by their very nature, all 
places relate to an interiority inextricably 
linked to a person’s sense of identity? Ar-
guing from first principles, Jeff Malpas—
one of the world’s preeminent place phi-
losophers—concludes that this is the case. 
Malpas’ starting point is a careful exam-
ination of what he calls a philosophical to-
pography of place and experience [16]. He 
examines the structure of place, not in the 
literal sense of landforms, rock strata, veg-
etation or buildings, but from the perspec-
tive that all places are nested—that they 
incorporate smaller places within them and 
open out into larger places of which they 
are part. In addition, places are narratively 
structured: Within them, the possibility of 
human beings taking action in the world 
and having a sense of identity develops. 
Place, Malpas argues, is the ground of hu-
man being and action. 
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In later work, Malpas elucidates one as-
pect of this overall structure—the interior-
ity of place and self. Writing about the 
memory of particular place experiences, he 
observes: 
 
The turning back to place and self, espe-
cially as given in recollection, typically has 
the character of a turn inward—and the in-
wardness or interiority that appears here 
can be said to belong to both place and the 
self. Place is that which contains, and in 
containing so it allows space in which what 
is given within the place can appear—but 
that appearing, whatever else it might be, 
is an appearing within [17]. 
 
Thus, the interiority of place and self 
arises together. This understanding is not 
straightforward, however, because the in-
terior of a place is usually hidden from us, 
 
obscured by our own tendency to look out-
ward to what appears before us rather than 
to ourselves or to that in which both we and 
what appears are held together [18]. 
 
The tendency is to regard the appearances 
of a place as “out there” and our sense of 
ourselves as “in here,” rather than allowing 
our experience of a place to take us to an 
understanding that both place and self are 
“held together” inwardly. 
This understanding can help overcome 
one of the primary pathologies of place at-
tachment, which is to fix one’s identity to 
the characteristics of a particular place, “a 
narrowing of mind and action” [19]. As a 
result, places can become fixed in the pub-
lic imagination (as in the phrase “This is 
the real Lake District”), or identities can be 
too tightly bound to place to the exclusion 
of others (as in the contention that “We are 
the true Serbians,” implying that others are 
not and do not belong there). 
Interiority, in the sense that Malpas uses 
the word, is the antidote. In the case of nar-
row place identity, he points to the broad-
ening effect of an inner orientation: 
 
Since the inward turning that belongs to 
the interiority of place never resolves itself 
into any final completion—the interiority 
of place constantly opens before us, but 
into an openness characterized by opacity 
as much as transparency—so there is al-
ways more to say about any and every 
place [20]. 
 
In the case of narrow self-identification 
with place, our identity is never to be found 
in the features of one place but, rather, “in 
the opening that is our own placedness” 
[21]. Our sense of self is similarly never 
complete but always in question and al-
ways as opaque as it is transparent. 
Malpas suggests that the journey into 
place is characterized by a dual movement: 
 
We exteriorize ourselves in the interiority 
of place at the same time as the interior of 
the place is interiorized in us. To be within 
a place is to find oneself affected by that 
place, to be oriented to its currents and di-
rections; it is to gain a feeling for the pat-
terns and rhythms of the place, of its own 
movements, of the density of the spaces 
within it, of the possibilities that it enables 
and the demands that it imposes [22]. 
 
This dual movement is difficult to grasp 
because its aspects refer to the interior of 
the place, not to its external characteristics 
per se. The key point here is that it is typi-
cally in remembering the experience of 
place that the turn inward occurs—the im-
plication being that, in the moment of be-
ing immersed in a place, it is difficult to 
make this turn because we tend to look 
only outward to appearances. 
To be clear, Malpas makes a general 
philosophical statement about the interior-
ity of all places and all people; with one 
exception, he does not refer to geograph-
ical or embodied interiors. This exception 
is in a footnote in which he argues that at-
tempts to interpret place experiences in 
purely psychoanalytical terms are mislead-
ing because psychoanalytic ideas are them-
selves based on topologies of the body—
“in the experience of the body’s own inte-
riorities and exteriorities, their intersection 
and affectivities” [23]. 
Malpas maintains that the idea of interi-
ority implies boundedness. What is beyond 
the bounds is exterior, and hence interior-
ity carries with it a sense of exteriority. 
Again, there is a dual movement: 
 
On the one hand, place draws us inward 
into its own singularity and interiority, on 
the other it projects us outward to other 
places with which it is necessarily entan-
gled… Every place is thus a place of shel-
ter and of setting out, a place of enclosure 
and also openness [24]. 
 
Malpas illustrates the entanglement of 
interiority and exteriority by pointing out 
that, in any place, there is interplay be-
tween earth (interior) and sky (exterior). 
Earth is bounded by sky and vice versa, 
and at every scale the two interpenetrate. 
Canyons are an interesting case in point be-
cause the experience of sky is extremely at-
tenuated. At the bottom of a slot canyon, 
the sky is only visible, if seen at all, as a 
strip of light far removed above. 
True, the canyon walls are separated by 
space that is contiguous with sky, but the 
far more important boundary is the stream 
marking the “floor” of the canyon. Their 
flowing water does not connect land and 
sky at the horizon, nor does it connect the 
experiencer experientially to other places 
downstream, even though cognitively he 
may understand that there are river flats 
and estuaries farther on. The result is that 
the interplay between interiority and exte-
riority is subdued, replaced by the active 
interpenetration of water and rock within a 
deep interior. 
 
Culture and place 
Individual conceptions of place and interi-
ority are mediated by one’s culture. As phi-
losopher Val Plumwood wrote:  
 
If in a place-centered culture, social cus-
toms, etiquette, and institutions in every 
way nurture and recognize relationships to 
place, modernist culture and institutions 
conversely and systematically neglect, 
frustrate, and deny these relationships 
[25]. 
 
There is, however, one aspect of mod-
ernist culture in which deep place relation-
ships are countenanced—the creative arts. 
I’ve already pointed out how poets, essay-
ists, and philosophers have drawn upon a 
sense of place in their work. The point is 
not so much that modernist culture system-
atically denies meaningful place relation-
ships. Rather, it systematically segregates 
place relationships into the domain of cre-
ative expression. It is extremely difficult to 
bring place responsiveness into practical 
discussions over energy use and produc-
tion, land use, and other responses to cli-
mate change, which in our society are the 
domain of economic and political thinking. 
One example is cultural notions relating 
to the world’s interiority, which have 
changed radically in the last millennium. 
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David Abram provides a broad overview 
of how significantly the old order has been 
overthrown [26]. The ancients had an “an-
cestral sense of the surrounding earthly 
cosmos as the voluminous inside” of a 
body, tent, or temple. 
The Copernican and subsequent scien-
tific revolutions overturned this worldview 
to replace it with the world as a pure out-
side. In the Newtonian universe, objectiv-
ity was “out there,” and subjectivity be-
longed only in the human realm. It is pre-
cisely this consignment of inner-ness 
solely to the human psyche and the denial 
of anima mundi that James Hillman, Peter 
Bishop and other depth psychologists con-
tend with. 
Abram argues for the possibility of both 
paradigms being valid in an intimately in-
terconnected manner. There is a way, he 
contends, to tell the stories from contem-
porary science of the evolution of life on 
earth and the strange nature of the cosmos 
in a spirit that is compatible with indige-
nous creation stories and with corporeal 
experience. Thus we “complete the Coper-
nican revolution,” bringing its insights 
down to earth, inside a living world rather 
than existing in a rarefied conceptualized 
“outside” [27]. 
I find it difficult, however, to conceive 
of how this further paradigm shift into an 
ecological worldview could take place in 
the culture as a whole, as opposed to within 
the occasional sympathetic individual. All 
the forces of a modern culture based on an 
objectivist view of reality are arrayed 
against such a shift. 
In pointed contrast to the West, indige-
nous societies exemplify place-centered 
cultures. Much has been written of the tra-
ditional Aboriginal cosmology—the per-
spective that “country” is sentient and re-
sponsive to human actions, whether it is 
sorrow at abandonment or neglect, or re-
sponding with abundance to the perfor-
mance of increase ceremonies. As ethnog-
rapher Deborah Bird Rose wrote, 
 
Animals, trees, rains, sun, moon—all are 
conscious. They watch us humans and 
think about us. No one person, animal, tree 
or hill knows everything, and the purposes 
of much that exists may remain obscure to 
others [28].  
 
Bill Neidje, a Kakadu elder from the 
Northern Territory, expressed his view of 
country directly when he wrote: 
I feel it with my body, 
with my blood.  
Feeling all these trees, 
All this country. 
When this wind blows you can feel it. 
Same for country… 
You can feel it. 
You can look, 
But feeling… 
That make you. 
 
Feeling make you, 
Out there in open space. 
He coming through your body. 
Look while he blow and feel with your 
body… 
Because tree just about your brother or fa-
ther… 
And tree is watching you [29]. 
 
The closest Aboriginal equivalent of 
Western ideas of inner-ness is the Dream-
ing, which is an all-inclusive term covering 
the spirit ancestors; the origin of all species 
and landforms; the Law that governs cere-
monies, songs and stories; and the eternal 
present in which all exists. This term refers 
both to the movement of spirit beings 
across the land giving birth to species and 
landforms as they moved, and to the 
Dreamtime when it occurred, which is be-
yond conventional notions of past, present, 
and future. 
All traditional Aboriginal people have a 
totem for which they have custodial re-
sponsibility, including participation in cer-
emonies to recapitulate the ancestral jour-
neys across the land. Look inside anything, 
“person, animal, tree or hill,” and there is 
the Dreaming. Clearly, there is an enor-
mous difference between the pathway into 
the Dreaming for a traditional Aboriginal 
person through myth, totem, ceremony, 
and custodial responsibility, which is per-
sonal, cultural, and spiritual at the same 
time; and the journey into interiority for 
Westerners [30]. 
 
Insideness and outsideness 
Geographer Edward Relph provides an-
other way to think about interiority and 
place. In his 1976 classic Place and Place-
lessness, he introduced the fundamental di-
alectic between the experience of “in-
sideness” and “outsideness” with regard to 
place [31]: 
 
The essence of place lies not so much in 
these [geographies, landscapes, cities and 
houses] as in the experience of an “inside” 
that is distinct from an “outside”… To be 
inside a place is to belong to it and to iden-
tify with it, and the more profoundly inside 
you are, the stronger is this identity with 
place [32]. 
 
Relph described a spectrum of place expe-
rience ranging from existential insideness, 
in which one feels unself-consciously that 
this is the place where one belongs; to em-
pathetic insideness, in which one con-
sciously and empathetically opens oneself 
to a place; to behavioral insideness, for ex-
ample, exploring a new place and figuring 
out how it all fits together; to incidental 
outsideness, in which place is the mere 
background to human activity; to objective 
outsideness, in which place is a series of 
objects to be manipulated by the planner or 
the scientist; to existential outsideness, in 
which one feels alienated and out of place 
[33]. 
Could existential insideness eventuate 
through prolonged empathetic identifica-
tion with a place rather than finding oneself 
an insider through birthplace or culture? 
On the Wollemi trip, as we arrived back 
among the familiar sheer honey-colored 
walls edging the plateau, Trish said “Ah, 
now I remember. I always forget this feel-
ing, of being here. Until I return.” I spon-
taneously answered with a rush of feeling, 
“This place is saying to us, ‘You have 
never left’.” I felt that, in some profound 
and mysterious way, the canyon country 
was always alive within us both, but it took 
a physical return to remind ourselves. If so, 
surely the phrase “always alive within” re-
fers to something existential—not the un-
selfconscious existential insideness that 
Relph describes, but nonetheless a manner 
of experience fundamental to one’s exist-
ence. 
One could also understand these feelings 
in terms of Lopez’s perspective that our 
patterns of thinking have been profoundly 
influenced by years of periodic immersion 
in canyon landscapes. In this sense, the im-
mediate recognition both my sister and I 
felt was not simply seeing the golden sand-
stone bluffs again but also a renewed 
glimpse into the deepest workings of our 
own minds. 
At first glance, the sense that the canyon 
is always alive within us appears to be an 
example of Malpas’ view that the interior 
of a place becomes interiorized within us. 
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On closer examination, however, this situ-
ation is more complex. The impetus for 
Malpas’ interiorization is the recollection 
of place experiences, whereas it took the 
physical encounter with the canyon itself 
to re-activate what had been dormant in our 
minds. We remembered the canyons’ qual-
ities and the events therein but had lost 
contact with that deeply felt connectivity. 
The power of recollection of place is still 
present, but it is incomplete without the 
embodied re-immersion in the canyons. 
Does it make sense to consider this con-
tinuum of insideness and outsideness with 
regard to how one inhabits one’s own 
body? If I look at my own case as a young 
man in the Rocky Mountains, I experi-
enced a combination of incidental and ex-
istential outsideness with regard to my own 
inner being, feeling out of touch with my 
body and self. 
I have since moved erratically along a 
spectrum toward insideness. I have en-
gaged in behavioral insideness by con-
sciously exploring inner dimensions 
through such methods as chi gong and 
yoga aimed at sensing the body energies 
from within and moving outward from 
those centers. Meditation and breath work 
have helped to direct my attention and 
breathing to different bodily parts. 
These efforts have led to moments of 
empathetic identification, though this 
deepening of awareness is very much a 
work in progress. My body is no longer 
foreign territory to me, and at best I can 
cultivate an atmosphere of care. I work to 
create a center of compassion toward oth-
ers and myself that motivates my actions 
toward others and the more-than-human 
world. 
Relph’s spectrum of place experiences is 
useful in describing the way that, during 
any day or any week, one can encounter a 
wide range of inner and outer situations. 
On one hand, I might feel existentially out 
of place within myself because I am 
ashamed of a selfish act. On the other hand, 
I might be out bushwalking or listening to 
an orchestral concert with the result that I 
feel unselfconsciously at home, suffused 
with well-being, and existentially inside. 
Much of the time, the bodily senses are 
our primary means for coming to know a 
place; some degree of body awareness is 
almost always necessary for a place expe-
rience of empathetic insideness. Opening 
oneself up to a place necessitates having a 
grasp of one’s own interiority, physical and 
otherwise. 
In Goethean science, grasping the es-
sence of a flowering plant, for example, re-
quires what Goethe called bildung, the 
schooling of the intuitive and bodily senses 
so that one comes to discern the “gesture” 
of the plant as it manifests itself within the 
body, mind, and feelings of the observer. 
I’ve found this way of seeing to be a slow, 
reciprocal process: The more I make an in-
ner effort to open my whole being recep-
tively to a plant, the more fully I can re-
spond to its revealed qualities [34]. 
Recent neuro-scientific investigations 
have cast light from another direction on 
the connection between the physical fea-
tures of a place and the internal functioning 
of the mind. Writer Kim Mahood draws on 
Nobel Prize-winning brain research to 
show that certain cells (“place cells”) in the 
hippocampus, where navigation, memory, 
and emotion seem to be coordinated, form 
cognitive maps of the environment. Neigh-
boring cells in the entorhinal cortex create 
spatial maps, fixing co-ordinates in a grid 
pattern: 
 
That the neural receptors which allow us 
to know where we are occur in the same 
nub of the brain that governs our emotions 
and the laying-in of our memories suggests 
that these capacities are wired into the 
same circuit… If our ability to find our way 
and to know where we are is tied inextrica-
bly to feeling and remembering, it goes 
some way to explaining why certain places 
cast a spell of enchantment on us [35]. 
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Pitching an Archive of Region 
Sue Michael 
Michael is an Australian artist and photographer whose work we have featured in earlier EAPs (fall 2014; winter/spring 2017). 
Michael wrote the text below for an exhibit of her work, “Settled Areas,” hosted by the West Gallery Thebarton, in Thebardon, 
South Australia, a suburb of Adelaide. The exhibit ran through February and March, 2019, and also included work by the South 
Australian photographer Mark Thomson. The gallery’s exhibition notice describes Michael’s work as “notations from a scanned 
horizon, glimpses or taxonomical sortings, using the heart as a sensory organ. Larger works consider the complexities of place 
often overlooked by the passing motorist.” More of her work can be viewed at www.behance.net/soomichael. smichael@west-
net.com.au. Text and images © 2019 Sue Michael. 
t was a crisp autumn’s night when I 
photographed a strange light in the 
sky above South Australia’s remote 
town of Marree. It was only upon my 
return home to my home city Adelaide that 
I discovered the light’s soft aqua glow, 
though at the time I remember a kind of 
cosmological feeling that “directed” me to 
look up 
I have just completed 20 years of formal 
Visual Art studies, and this exhibition 
gives me new freedoms where no grade is 
assigned and no personal justifications 
must be debated by academic evaluators. 
Instead, in these works, I present the open-
ended investigations of regional South 
Australia where I have used the heart as a 
sensory organ. Joy was my compass. 
Nineteenth-century German geographer 
and explorer Alexander Von Humboldt 
(1769–1859), documented new locations 
with a thorough, systemized approach and 
a ceaseless enthusiasm. He noted all that he 
could from his rainforest boat, including 
the sounds, smells, mood and “feel” of his 
experiences. He collected plants, animals, 
rocks, perhaps informed by his friend Goe-
the’s ideas relating to environmental and 
place wholeness and interconnections. 
In a similar way, I sketch, note, and re-
search all manner of small details on my 
various travels north and west of Adelaide. 
I have filled 38 journals in the past five 
years, and I can assuredly say every page 
has helped in my understanding of South 
Australian placemaking. My diverse ob-
servations, sometimes of seemingly unim-
portant or unrelated daily activities, have 
cemented a personal rationale as to why 
things are as they are. 
Since childhood, I have been keenly 
aware of shifts in regional settlement and 
social conditions in this part of South Aus-
tralia. Though I am part of six ancestral 
generations who lived in South Australia, 
it is my children who are the first to be 
wholly urban dwellers. 
 
n doing my paintings and photographs, 
there was an option to focus on the ide-
ologies that swirl through regional 
matters, but instead, I have sought out lived 
experience, informed by first-hand ac-
counts. There was a feeling that my long-
gone ancestors watch over me. Their per-
ceived presence held a sort of grounding 
and balance for my inquisitive adventures 
in that I felt required to reflect on how they 
might feel about my work. 
The notion that the dead have needs also 
secured the theory for me that place is en-
during and ongoing, with ever-moving 
edges not to be secured. Consequently, it 
seemed more appropriate to present a wide 
field rather than to uphold a definitive and 
possibly subjective pronouncement or 
claim. 
Life-as-it-is holds mysterious qualities 
that require further attention. In my experi-
ence, landscape can hold a strong grasp on 
one’s triangulated thoughts, imaginings, 
and emotions. Even if a vista is nearly de-
void of visual contrasts, there can be com-
forting emotions to draw upon, even if dec-
ades have passed. Some landscapes, espe-
cially those not “tourist” in orientation, 
called me back in time, as though heart 
strings remained connected to certain 
places. 
 
 am now a somewhat unsettled city 
dweller, requiring refreshment from 
South Austria’s regions and reliant on 
my heart’s emotion and instinctive glances 
to collate my work. As McCraty and col-
leagues (McCraty et al. 2004) explain: 
 
Although our finding that the heart is in-
volved in intuitive perception may be sur-
prising from one perspective, it is worth 
noting that in virtually all human cultures, 
ancient and modern, the heart has long 
been regarded as a conduit to a source of 
information and wisdom beyond normal 
awareness. 
 
Many of the over-fifty sketches, paint-
ings and monoprints I have made for “Set-
tled Areas” may have a certain roughness 
not often in demand in the commercial 
worlds. Beside this aesthetic imperfection, 
many of my works have an instinctive 
freshness or sense of immediacy, sup-
ported by a foundation of deep research 
into the complexities of place. 
The larger paintings are created with the 
help of photocollage as a “useful fiction” 
and philosophical device. This flexibility 
allows an essential understanding to coa-
lesce on the one picture plane My works 
are of the region, though the specific man-
ifestation can never be found. 
These representations stand as they 




McCraty, R., Atkinson, M., and Bradley, 
R.T., 2004.  Electrophysiological Evidence 
of Intuition: Part 1, The Surprising Role of 
the Heart, Journal of Alternative and Com-



























































Sue Michael, Barking Brown Dog Chases Car 
Every Morning 11am, Marree. 2018, acrylic on 
canvas, 60 x 156 cm 
Sue Michael, Eudunda Streetscape, 2018, acrylic 
on canvas, 21 x 152 cm 
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Sue Michael, Pinky Kitchen, 2019, acrylic on canvas, 46 x 92 cm 
 
Sue Michael, Pt. Germein Outbuildings, 2018, acrylic on canvas, 46 x 92 cm 
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Sue Michael, Yongala Dressage Ring, 2018, acrylic on canvas, 24 x 92 cm 
 
Sue Michael, Eudunda Ornamental Garden, 2019, acrylic on canvas, 60 x 120 cm 
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Sue Michael, Site for Nightly Evening Bonfires, Marree, 2019, acrylic on canvas, 60 x 120 cm 
 
Sue Michael, Beach Shack, Lucky Bay, 2018, acrylic on canvas, 120 x 150 cm 
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Sue Michael, General Store, Robertstown, 2019, acrylic on canvas, 46 x 91 cm 
2019 
Acrylic on canvas 
46 x 91 cm 
 
Sue Michael, Marree Night Sky, 2018, digital photograph 
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Sue Michael, Coffin Bay, 2019, acrylic on canvas, 61 x 152 cm 
Sue Michael, Sunday Drive, 2019, acrylic on canvas, 61 x 152 cm 
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Questions relating to environmental and architectural phenomenology (from EAP, 2014, 25th-anniversary issue) 
 
Questions relating to phenomenology 
and related interpretive approaches 
and methods: 
❖ What is phenomenology and what does 
it offer to whom?  
❖ What is the state of phenomenological 
research today? What are your hopes 
and concerns regarding phenomenol-
ogy? 
❖ Does phenomenology continue to have 
relevance in examining human experi-
ence in relation to world? 
❖ Are there various conceptual and meth-
odological modes of phenomenology 
and, if so, how can they be categorized 
and described? 
❖ Has phenomenological research been 
superseded by other conceptual ap-
proaches—e.g., post-structuralism, so-
cial-constructionism, critical theory, re-
lationalist and non-representational per-
spectives, the various conceptual 
“turns,” and so forth? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mak-
ing a better world? If so, what are the 
most crucial phenomena and topics to 
be explored phenomenologically? 
❖ Can phenomenological research offer 
practical results in terms of design, 
planning, policy, and advocacy? 
❖ How might phenomenological insights 
be broadcast in non-typical academic 
ways—e.g., through artistic expression, 
theatrical presentation, digital evoca-
tion, virtual realities, and so forth? 
❖ What are the most important aims for 
future phenomenological research? 
❖ Do the various post-structural and so-
cial-constructionist criticisms of phe-
nomenology—that it is essentialist, 
masculinist, authoritative, voluntarist, 
ignorant of power structures, and so 
forth—point toward its demise? 
 
Questions relating to the natural 
world and environmental and ecologi-
cal concerns: 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of na-
ture and the natural world? 
❖ What can phenomenology offer the in-
tensifying environmental and ecological 
crises we face today? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to more 
sustainable actions and worlds? 
❖ Can one speak of a sustainable life-
world? 
❖ What is a phenomenology of a lived en-
vironmental ethic and who are the key 
contributors? 
❖ Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a 
role in caring for the natural world? For 
places? For lifeworlds broadly? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to envi-
ronmental education? If so, in what 
ways? 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of the 
two laws of thermodynamics, especially 
the second law claiming that all activi-
ties, left to their own devices, tend to-
ward greater disorder and fewer possi-
bilities? Are there ways whereby phe-
nomenological understanding of life-
world might help to reduce the acceler-
ating disordering of natural and human 
worlds? 
 
Questions relating to place, place ex-
perience, and place meaning: 
❖ Why has the topic of place become an 
important phenomenological topic? 
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding 
of place contribute to better place mak-
ing? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to a 
generative understanding of place and 
place making? 
❖ What roles do bodily regularity and ha-
bitual inertia play in the constitution of 
place and place experience? 
❖ What are the lived relationships be-
tween place, sustainability, and a re-
sponsive environmental ethic? 
❖ How are phenomenological accounts to 
respond to post-structural interpreta-
tions of space and place as rhizomic and 
a “meshwork of paths” (Ingold)? 
❖ Can phenomenological accounts incor-
porate a “progressive sense of place” 
argued for by critical theorists like 
Doreen Massey? 
❖ Can phenomenological explications of 
space and place account for human dif-
ferences—gender, sexuality, less-
abledness, social class, cultural back-
ground, and so forth? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to the 
politics and ideology of place? 
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding 
of lived embodiment and habitual iner-
tia be drawn upon to facilitate robust 
places and to generate mutual support 
and awareness among places, especially 
places that are considerably different 
(e.g., different ethnic neighborhoods or 
regions)? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mo-
bility, the nature of “flows,” rhizomic 
spaces, the places of mobility, non-
spaces and their relationship to mobility 
and movement? 
 
Questions relating to architecture and 
environmental design and policy: 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of archi-
tecture and architectural experience and 
meaning? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to bet-
ter architectural design? 
❖ How do qualities of the designable 
world—spatiality, materiality, lived 
aesthetics, environmental embodiment 
etc.—contribute to lifeworlds? 
❖ What are the most pertinent environ-
mental and architectural features con-
tributing to a lifeworld’s being one way 
rather than another? 
❖ What role will cyberspace and digital 
technologies have in 21st-century life-
worlds? How will they play a role in 
shaping designed environments, partic-
ularly architecture? 
❖ What impact will digital advances and 
virtual realities have on physical em-
bodiment, architectural design, and 
real-world places? Will virtual reality 
eventually be able to simulate “real re-
ality” entirely? If so, how does such a 
development transform the nature of 
lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and ar-
chitecture? 
❖ Can virtual worlds become so “real” 
that they are lived as “real” worlds? 
 
Other potential questions: 
❖ What is the lived relationship between 
people and the worlds in which they 
find themselves? 
❖ Can lifeworlds be made to happen self-
consciously? If so, how? Through what 
individual efforts? Through what group 
efforts? 
❖ Can a phenomenological education in 
lifeworld, place, and environmental em-
bodiment assist citizens and profession-
als in better understanding the workings 
and needs of real-world places and 
thereby contribute to their envisioning 
and making? 
❖ Is it possible to speak of human-rights-
in-place or place justice? If so, would 
such a possibility move attention and 
supportive efforts toward improving the 
places in which people and other living 
beings find themselves, rather than fo-
cusing only on the rights and needs of 
individuals and groups without consid-
eration of their place context? 
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his issue completes thirty years 
of Environmental and Architec-
tural Phenomenology. As editor, 
I find it hard to believe that, so 
long ago, philosopher Robert Mugerauer, 
interior-design educator Margaret Bos-
chetti, and I met for breakfast at the 1989 
Environmental Design Research Associa-
tion (EDRA) conference to make plans for 
an interdisciplinary newsletter that would 
cover phenomenological and associated 
qualitative work relating to environmental 
and architectural concerns.  
To mark EAP’s quarter century of publi-
cation in fall, 2014, I assembled a list of 
questions pertinent to phenomenology 
broadly and to environmental and architec-
tural phenomenology specifically; this list 
is reproduced on the proceeding page (p. 
36). In turn, I asked some sixty individuals 
associated with the field to respond to 
questions in this list or to otherwise con-
tribute a short essay relating to some aspect 
of environmental and architectural phe-
nomenology. The result was nineteen com-
mentaries representing a wide range of dis-
ciplines and professions including anthro-
pology, architecture, art, ecology, geogra-
phy, philosophy, psychology, and environ-
mental education.  These essays provide a 
useful overview of the state of environ-
mental and architectural phenomenology 
in the early 2000s. 
Since spring 2019, I have pondered how 
EAP’s thirtieth year of publication might 
be benchmarked. Thirty years seem some-
how less significant than twenty-five 
years, and I decided that the most appropri-
ate undertaking for this eighty-sixth issue 
is an “editorial” discussing the current state 
of phenomenology broadly. Rather than 
focus on environmental and architectural 
themes specifically (though I touch on 
these themes throughout), I decided to 
highlight three current conceptual and 
methodological concerns relating to phe-
nomenology as a philosophy, method, and 
conceptual vision. These three concerns 
are as follows: 
 
1. Placing phenomenology: What is phe-
nomenology as a philosophy, research 
method, and way of understanding? One 
would suppose this question had long 
since been answered but, in fact, the mat-
ter remains controversial as indicated by 
recent debates among philosopher Dan 
Zahavi, educator Max van Manen, nurs-
ing researcher John Paley, and psycholo-
gists Amedeo Giorgi, James Morley, and 
Jonathan A. Smith. 
2. Evaluating phenomenology: A central 
concern of phenomenology is describing 
and interpreting phenomena accurately 
and comprehensively. What is trustwor-
thiness in phenomenological work? How 
can descriptive and interpretive validity 
be gaged phenomenologically? In what 
interpretive ways can researchers en-
counter, see, and learn about their topic 
of study? How comprehensively and 
deeply can we “know” the phenomenon? 
Here, I bring forward possibilities of-
fered by philosopher Brice R. Wachter-
hauser. 
3. Displacing phenomenology: Has phe-
nomenology run its course academi-
cally? Is phenomenology too caught up 
in a universalist essentialism that ignores 
human and group differences? Can there 
be a phenomenology that is critical and 
able to incorporate power, diversity, and 
difference? Does phenomenology some-
how need to be recast or even replaced 
entirely via a so-called “post-phenome-
nology” or “critical phenomenology” 
that claims to integrate the best of phe-
nomenological and post-structural 
points of view? In responding to these 
questions, I give particular attention to a 
recent thematic issue of the architectural 
journal Log, entitled “disorienting phe-
nomenology.” 
 
1. Placing phenomenology 
In the last three years, there has appeared a 
spate of exchanges on the nature of phe-
nomenology written by eminent phenome-
nological thinkers Amedeo Giorgi, James 
Morley, Jonathan A. Smith, Max van 
Manen, and Dan Zahavi. 
From what I can tell, this set of ex-
changes began because of a controversial 
book, Phenomenology as Qualitative Re-
search, written by non-phenomenologist 
and nursing-science researcher John Paley 
(2017). In this work, Paley was highly crit-
ical of phenomenological research as used 
by health scientists, particularly in the field 
of nursing. His most damning criticism 
was that phenomenological researchers of-
fer no precise method for explaining how 
they arrive at the interpretive meaning they 
claim to identify in experiential descrip-
tions (e.g., respondent narratives arising 
from open-ended interviews). He ended his 
book by advising nursing researchers to 
think twice about adopting a phenomeno-
logical approach in their research. 
In developing his criticism, Paley drew 
largely on the discussions of phenomeno-
logical research as laid out by Giorgi, 
Smith, and van Manen. Unsettled by what 
they considered to be an unfair and errone-
ous understanding of their work, Giorgi 
(2017) and van Manen (2017c) both wrote 
spirited critiques of Paley’s book; Paley re-
sponded with fire-rousing rejoinders (Pa-
ley, 2018a, 2018b). 
Around the same time that Paley’s book 
appeared, the editors of Qualitative Health 
Research published a special 2017 journal 
issue on phenomenological research, head-
lined with two opening articles by van 
Manen (2017a, 2017b): “But Is It Phenom-
enology?” and “Phenomenology in its 
Original Sense.” In the first article, van 
Manen argued that one of the most popular 
current methods associated with phenome-
nological research—Interpretative Phe-
nomenological Analysis (IPA)—was not 
correctly phenomenological in method or 
results. 
This discussion led to a 2018 rejoinder, 
“Yes, It Is Phenomenological,” by Jona-
than A. Smith (2018), the principal founder 
of IPA. In turn, Smith’s commentary was 
responded to by van Manen (2018), who 
T
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held to his original criticisms of IPA and 
developed them further (“Present IPA for 
What It Is—Interpretative Psychological 
Analysis”). Smith (2010) and Giorgi 
(2010, 2011) had already partaken in a 
back-and-forth debate as to whether IPA 
was genuinely phenomenological (Giorgi 
declared that it was not). 
Perhaps because of Smith and van 
Manen’s considerable disagreement in the 
QHR exchange, the journal editors pub-
lished a 2019 response to both commen-
taries by the distinguished phenomenolog-
ical philosopher Dan Zahavi, who entitled 
his entry,” Getting It Quite Wrong,” argu-
ing that both van Manen and Smith misun-
derstood phenomenology. In addition, Za-
havi (2019a) published a critical commen-
tary on Giorgi’s phenomenological 
method; and with philosopher Kristian 
Martiny, a critical commentary on phe-
nomenological research in nursing studies 
(Zahavi and Martiny 2019). This second 
entry provoked a spirited rebuttal from 
psychologist James Morley (2019), an as-
sociate of Giorgi. In reference to Zahavi as 
a philosopher, Morley (2019, in press) 
made the provocative point that “It has 
been remarkable the extent to which so 
many phenomenological philosophers 
have been so unaware of the divergent 
ways in which phenomenology has been 
applied to qualitative research.” 
I bring forward this series of commen-
taries and critiques because they demon-
strate the wide range of ways in which phe-
nomenology is interpreted and understood 
today. Philosopher Herbert Spiegelberg 
(1982, p. xxviii) emphasized that there are 
as many phenomenologies as there are 
phenomenologists, and the competing 
claims laid out in these several, often-con-
tradictory, entries illustrate some of the 
most glaring disagreements, of which here 
I highlight three: 
 
1.1 Disagreements about substantive fo-
cus: Does phenomenology entail inter-
pretive exegesis of seminal phenome-
nological texts by Husserl, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, and so forth? Or 
is phenomenology a continuing process 
of discovering phenomena via open-
ness, wonder, and firsthand encounter, 
whether via one’s own experience or 
experiences as described by others? 
1.2. Disagreements about insight: Are 
phenomenological claims discovered 
or constructed? Are phenomenological 
realizations always already present in 
experience or are they creatively gener-
ated by the researcher and therefore a 
result of human intervention and inven-
tion? 
1.3. Disagreements about how the phe-
nomenon is to be used phenomeno-
logically:  Does phenomenology em-
phasize experiential descriptions or 
does it use those experiential descrip-
tions as a means for broader conceptual 
interpretations and generalizations? 
 
1.1. Disagreements about substantive 
focus 
These disagreements are particularly pro-
nounced in the back-and-forth commen-
taries between van Manen and Zahavi, who 
identify considerably different starting and 
ending points for phenomenological re-
search. For van Manen, phenomenology 
focuses on rich, thorough descriptions of 
lived experience that unfold via an en-
gaged openness to the phenomenon: “the 
study of how things appear, show, or give 
themselves in lived experience or in con-
sciousness” (van Manen 2017a, p. 775). He 
writes that phenomenology “is driven by a 
sense of wonder and enigma regarding the 
meaningfulness of human existence, phe-
nomena, and events” (van Manen 2019, p. 
914). 
Van Manen (2019, p. 910) criticizes Za-
havi’ work because it involves little actual 
phenomenological discovery but empha-
sizes instead a “philosophical exegesis” of 
the major phenomenological thinkers, par-
ticularly Husserl. These cerebral explica-
tions, says van Manen (2019, p. 913), are 
mostly produced by philosophers, who “ar-
gue about issues of phenomenology rather 
than do a phenomenology of lifeworld phe-
nomena or events. For many outsiders, the 
technical philosophical terminology [of 
these thinkers] … can be rather impenetra-
ble.” 
Such sophisticated conceptual analysis 
and interpretation may be useful for philo-
sophical clarifications of phenomenology, 
but: 
That is only half the story—the mission of 
modern phenomenology transcends foun-
dational and exegetical philosophical the-
orizing. To do phenomenological research 
is a more comprehensive and thoughtful 
project than proposed by Dan Zahavi (van 
Manen 2019, p. 910).  
In turn, Zahavi (2019b, p. 901) criticizes 
van Manen’s phenomenological approach 
because it has “little to do with phenome-
nology understood as a specific method or 
tradition in philosophy.” When the major 
phenomenological thinkers 
 
engaged in phenomenological philoso-
phizing, they most definitely were not 
simply seeking to offer fine-grained de-
scriptions of the qualitative character of 
different experiences…. Amassing experi-
ential descriptions is a poor substitute for 
the systematic and argumentative work 
that we find in the phenomenological phi-
losophers. 
Offering descriptions of “what this expe-
rience is like” would not allow us to eluci-
date the kind of questions that the phenom-
enological philosophers have often been 
occupied with, say, the relation between 
perceptual intentionality and scientific ra-
tionality [or] the link between subjectivity 
and objectivity…. 
It is no coincidence that many of the phe-
nomenologists dismissed a purely descrip-
tive endeavor devoid of systematic ambi-
tions as mere ‘picture-book phenomenol-
ogy’” (Zahavi 2019b, p. 901) [1]. 
 
In responding to van Manen and Za-
havi’s concerns, I would argue that, yes, 
we need the conceptual exegeses of the 
major phenomenological works, but we 
also need accurate, comprehensive expli-
cations of specific lifeworlds, natural atti-
tudes, and lived experiences. As Zahavi 
demands, we must continue to write about 
phenomenology, but we also must do phe-
nomenology and perhaps recognize life-
world phenomena of which earlier phe-
nomenological philosophers were una-
ware. 
For example, recent phenomenological 
research relating to environmental con-
cerns has identified phenomena like place, 
atmosphere, environmental encounter, 
lived emplacement, and environmental 
embodiment—all phenomena mostly ig-
nored by first-generation phenomenologi-
cal philosophers but offering useful new 
angles on that earlier phenomenological 
work. In this sense, both Zahavi (2019, p. 
9) and van Manen (2019, p. 924) agree 
that, “if phenomenology is to avoid the 
dead end of stale abstractions, it has to re-
connect to the richness of everyday life” 
(Zahavi 2019, p. 9). 
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Ultimately, phenomenology as a way of 
conceptual and applied study is defined, 
understood, and conducted in a wide range 
of ways. One means for identifying these 
differences is to examine definitions of 
phenomenology offered by phenomenolo-
gists as illustrated in the twenty-three de-
scriptions of phenomenology that I have 
assembled at the end of this essay. Readers 
might study these descriptions and locate 
thematic commonalities and differences. 
One aim would be to generate one’s own 
definition of phenomenology. 
One of the most accessible scholars writ-
ing the kind of careful intellectual exegesis 
appreciated by Zahavi is philosopher Der-
mot Moran; for example, his introduction 
to phenomenology (Moran 2000) and his 
articles on the habitual dimension of life-
world as understood by Husserl (Moran 
2011, 2014) are particularly lucid in 
demonstrating how the seminal philosoph-
ical texts in phenomenology remain an im-
portant source for understanding human 
being and human life. 
I also recommend psychotherapist Linda 
Finlay’s 2011 Phenomenology for Thera-
pists, which remains one of the most fair-
minded efforts to place the wide range of 
phenomenologists and phenomenological 
approaches and demonstrate how they re-
late to the same conceptual and methodo-
logical tradition. Finlay illustrates this 
range of phenomenological possibilities as 
it can incorporate both thinking and feel-
ing, both cerebral effort and intuitive dis-
covery: 
 
Phenomenological descriptions often blur 
the boundaries between science and art…. 
Some phenomenological researchers are 
more concerned to be rigorous and system-
atic, taking a science-like approach to of-
fering fine-grained normative descrip-
tions. Others take imaginative flight using 
poetic flourishes, images, and metaphors. 
Rather than see phenomenology as ei-
ther science or art, it might best be consid-
ered along a continuum with pure rigor-
ous, scientific description on one end and 
fluidly poetic interpretation on the other, 
with most practice falling somewhere in 
between (Finlay 2011, pp. 18–19). 
 
1.2. Disagreements about insight 
The disagreements here relate to whether 
phenomenological realizations appear via 
empathetic, serendipitous openness or are 
arbitrarily generated via imposed intellec-
tual effort. How, in other words, is mean-
ing distilled from experience or text? This 
concern is central to nursing researcher 
John Paley’s claim that the so-called “dis-
coveries” of phenomenological inquiry in-
corporate “self-deception” because phe-
nomenologists can offer no set of proce-
dures or guidelines to explain how these 
moments of discovery happen or how they 
can be claimed to be accurate or reliable: 
 
If the researcher does not specify criteria 
for what counts as a “deeper meaning”; if 
she fails to explain how she identifies the 
“deeper meaning”; if she does not say why 
the “deeper meaning” is important and 
what we’re supposed to do with it; if she 
does not … spell out the relation between 
the “deeper meaning” of the text and a so-
ciological theory … then why should the 
reader looking for solid evidence take any 
notice of her? (Paley 2017, p. 26). 
 
For sure, this criticism is difficult to coun-
ter because, as Spiegelberg (1982, p. 672) 
famously wrote,  
 
phenomenology begins in silence.  Only he 
[or she] who has experienced genuine per-
plexity and frustration in the face of the 
phenomena when trying to find the proper 
description for them knows what phenom-
enological seeing really means. 
 
In phenomenological research, there is 
the assumption that sincere interest in the 
phenomenon will, sooner or later, offer the 
space for that phenomenon to reveal itself 
in the ways it is. One thinks of Heidegger’s 
enigmatic description of phenomenology: 
“To let that which shows itself be seen 
from itself in the very way in which it 
shows itself from itself” (Heidegger 1962, 
p. 58). How, in other words, might we en-
gage the phenomenon so that it freely has 
the space and time to be what it is rather 
than what we might suppose, imagine, 
claim, or dictate it to be? (Seamon, 2018, 
p. 10). 
As a social constructionist who assumes 
that meaning is actively imposed rather 
than integral to the phenomenon, Paley 
cannot accept the “aha!” moments of see-
ing that phenomenologists claim possible. 
Because of his ontological, epistemologi-
cal, and professional starting points, Pa-
ley’s criticism is not surprising, since he 
has never done phenomenological research 
himself and appears to be unfamiliar with 
these sudden moments of insight that phe-
nomenological effort can facilitate. 
There is no easy counter for Paley’ criti-
cism other than to say that, once one be-
comes proficient in doing phenomenology, 
these moments of insight do happen, much 
of the time spontaneously with little or no 
intellectual intervention. Van Manen de-
picts these unexpected moments in which 
the phenomenologist better “sees” the phe-
nomenon as “meaning insights.” He 
writes: 
 
[M]eaning insights depend on a “latency” 
that eventuates an experience of clarity. 
This clarity of … meaningfulness may be 
sudden but is more associated with a sense 
of opening oneself and a constant search-
ing for understanding the meaning of 
something. Indeed, this opening and 
searching may be associated with the phe-
nomenological epoché (opening up) and 
the reduction (closing down and focusing 
on something) …. 
Meaning insights tend to occur when we 
wonder about the sense of the significance 
of the originary meaning of an experiential 
phenomenon. Originary does not mean 
new or original. Originary means incep-
tual: originary insights reveal the primal 
meaning and significance of a phenome-
non …. 
Insightfulness should not be confused 
with creativity. From a phenomenological 
perspective, the occurrence of a “flash of 
insight” is more intriguing than under-
standing it as a creative act. In a creative 
act, the subject is the creator, the agent of 
the creation. But inceptual insights do not 
necessarily depend on my creative agency, 
rather an inceptual thought may happen to 
me as a gift, a grace—an event that I could 
neither plan nor foresee …. 
The problem for phenomenological re-
searchers is that a meaningful insight often 
cannot be secured by a planned systematic 
method. There are no technicalities, proce-
dures, schemes, packages, or programs 
that will somehow produce or capture an 
insightful thought or creative insight (van 
Manen 2017b, pp. 822–823). 
 
Though I understand Paley’s dubious-
ness regarding these meaning insights, I 
agree with van Manen that they occur ex-
actly in the way he describes: unexpected, 
surprising, and often happening only after 
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long effort of “being with” the phenome-
non and hoping that something will be 
seen. 
One of my strongest personal recollec-
tions of such a moment is when I was writ-
ing the dissertation that would eventually 
become A Geography of the Lifeworld 
(Seamon 1979). I had collected some 1,500 
firsthand observations on “everyday envi-
ronmental experience” from focus groups 
that met weekly for several months. One 
afternoon, in a discouraged mood, I yet 
again read through these observations, de-
spondent because I could find no thematic 
structure to house the observations concep-
tually. 
Suddenly, I realized that almost all the 
observations had to do with one of three 
broad themes: everyday movement 
(grounded in the habituality of the lived 
body and environmental embodiment); 
everyday rest (including “places for 
things” and “at-homeness”) and everyday 
encounter (ranging from world oblivious-
ness to noticing, watching, and heightened 
contact with some aspect of the world). I 
can honestly say that this moment was rev-
elatory, happening in an instant; the three-
fold structure “sprang” from the observa-
tions rather than from some arbitrary, pre-
defined structure. 
Here, we face one of the most controver-
sial aspects of phenomenological work: 
That to see and understand the phenome-
non, one must genuinely believe that there 
are things to be seen. If phenomenologists 
are to really “discover,” they must be 
deeply interested in their phenomena and 
wholeheartedly trust that there are things to 
be understood, provided one proceeds with 
patience, earnestness, persistence, and 
hope. 
 
1.3. Disagreements about locating and 
defining the phenomenon 
These disagreements relate to whether 
phenomenology involves only the explica-
tion of a particular experience, or whether 
that explication is to be placed in some 
larger systematic structure whereby human 
life and experience are understood more 
broadly. 
Ignoring Paley’s criticisms, Giorgi, 
Smith, and van Manen all agree that phe-
nomenology requires revelatory moments 
of seeing and understanding. The point of 
contention, however, is whether these rev-
elations remain within the sphere of expe-
rience or become a starting point for wider 
interpretation and theory. This disagree-
ment is central to Giorgi, Smith, and van 
Manen’s discussions, though each pro-
vides different answers. 
All three researchers accept that phe-
nomenology’s starting point is everyday 
lived experience, but each has a different 
understanding of how that experience is to 
be discovered and used phenomenologi-
cally. Among these three researchers, 
Giorgi takes the most conventional phe-
nomenological position, aiming to remain 
close to original phenomenological 
sources, particularly Husserl’s requirement 
for a “phenomenological reduction” (i.e., 
making certain one focuses on the phe-
nomenon without supposition or preju-
dice). The phenomenological aim is to lo-
cate accurate descriptions of essential 
structures of human experience grounded 
in and remaining faithful to specific expe-
riential accounts; interpretive embellish-
ment is to be watched for and avoided. As 
Giorgi (2009, p. 127) explains, 
 
A descriptive [phenomenological] analysis 
… does not go beyond the given…. The de-
scriptive researcher obviously sees the 
same ambiguities that an interpretive anal-
ysis would see but is not motivated to clar-
ify them by bringing in non-given or spec-
ulative factors. An interpretive analysis… 
usually strives for an interpretation that is 
theoretically elegant or … relatively com-
plete. A descriptive result is more incho-
ate; it dares not go beyond what is present. 
Gaps in the results are filled by obtaining 
more [descriptive evidence], not by theo-
retical speculation. 
 
In practice, Giorgi gathers experiential 
accounts via interviews or written proto-
cols that are then transcribed and analyzed 
in a multi-step process that, besides the re-
searcher’s setting aside all past under-
standings of the phenomenon (the phe-
nomenological reduction), includes study-
ing the descriptions thoroughly so that one 
pictures the descriptive series as a whole; 
then carefully examining the descriptions 
again, breaking them into meaning units to 
make the descriptions more manageable 
and understandable phenomenologically. 
Next, any broader lived meanings indi-
cated by the experiential accounts are iden-
tified and elaborated. Finally, the re-
searcher integrates the analysis to describe 
the phenomenon most broadly, making 
sure this descriptive structure accurately 
incorporates and reflects the original expe-
riential accounts. Morley (2019) empha-
sizes that: 
 
Giorgi’s method cannot be understood 
apart from his wider, more radical theoret-
ical project of inaugurating an autono-
mous psychology on a purely phenomeno-
logical basis—a whole disciplinary para-
digm that is a unified theoretical ap-
proach, methodology, and specifically psy-
chological content. 
 
In contrast to Giorgi’s emphasis on de-
scription and broader disciplinary aims, 
van Manen is more freewheeling and inter-
pretive. He poses phenomenological in-
quiry in terms of a questioning: For exam-
ple, what is it like to be bored? What is it 
like to have a conversation? What is it like 
to experience a meaningful look? The aim 
is to draw on real-world accounts of human 
experience to understand “what the con-
crete experience consists in” (van Manen 
2017b, pp. 815–819). He explains: 
 
[T]he phenomenological feature of “lived 
experience” aims to be a corrective: It 
guards against the common inclination to 
understand our experiences prematurely in 
a cliché, conceptual, predetermined, bio-
graphical, theoretical, polemical, or 
taken-for-granted manner. In other words, 
the adjective “lived” only becomes meth-
odologically significant once we under-
stand the import of the role it plays in phe-
nomenological inquiry to investigate the 
primal or inceptual meaning aspects of ex-
perience as we “live” through them (van 
Manen 2017b, p. 212). 
 
Jonathan Smith’s phenomenological ap-
proach is yet again different and largely fo-
cused on practical, real-world situations 
and problems, especially those relating to 
health and illness (Smith 2011). The aim is 
idiographic accounts of respondents’ expe-
riences and understandings and how the re-
spondents themselves make sense of those 
experience and understandings. For exam-
ple, what is life like after having a heart at-
tack? What is the experience of individuals 
who must use a ventricular assist device 
(VAD) for a failing heart? How is dialysis 
40





treatment or chronic fatigue syndrome ex-
perienced? 
Typically, the IPA researcher starts by 
eliciting each individual’s experience sep-
arately and then locating patterns across 
the individual cases. Smith speaks of a 
double hermeneutic—in other words, the 
complex situation in which the researcher 
attempts to understand the ways that re-
spondents understand their experience. He 
explains that, for the researcher, 
 
part of the complication derives from the 
fact that access to [the experience studied] 
comes from a participant who is him/her-
self also engaged in making sense of what 
is happening to them. For this reason, I 
have described the process of IPA as a 
double hermeneutic, whereby the re-
searcher is trying to make sense of the par-
ticipants trying to make sense of what is 
happening to them (Smith 2011, p. 10). 
 
From my perspective, the most critical 
part of phenomenological method relates 
to the particular phenomenon in which one 
is interested. In other words, the nature of 
the phenomenon plays the central role in 
establishing how it will be approached 
methodologically and toward what degree 
of description or interpretation the re-
searcher must aim. Smith and van Manen 
offer phenomenological approaches that 
are more open-ended methodologically, 
whereas Giorgi offers a descriptive process 
that is more directed and systematic. Yet 
again, the recent phenomenological work 
on place and emplacement is much broader 
and more eclectic in methods of explica-
tion and in substantive conclusions (e.g., 
Casey 2009; Malpas 2018; Seamon 2018). 
Conceptually and procedurally, there is 
a wide range of ways phenomenologically 
to identify, describe, and interpret any phe-
nomenon. The central aim is finding ways 
whereby that phenomenon is most likely 
able to present itself as fully as possible in 
the ways it actually is. On one hand, the 
phenomena of phenomenological research 
may be quotidian and singular—for exam-
ple, studying the habitual, daily walking 
routines among older people visiting a 
neighborhood park (van Eck and Pijpers 
2016). On the other hand, the phenomena 
examined may be much broader, more gen-
eralizable, and therefore more applicable 
to phenomenological theory—for exam-
ple, probing the lived and conceptual rela-
tionship among Husserl’s notions of life-
world, homeworld, and alienworld 
(Donohoe 2014; Seamon 2013; Steinbock 
1995). 
 
2. Evaluating phenomenology 
For any manner of qualitative research, 
there is always Paley’s question of descrip-
tive and interpretive trustworthiness. How 
reliable are the evidentiary sources of a re-
searcher’s broader claims and do those 
claims evenhandedly and thoroughly arise 
from those sources and represent them ac-
curately? One way to circumvent some of 
the criticisms of phenomenology high-
lighted above is to evaluate phenomeno-
logical studies in terms of the finished re-
search product rather than emphasizing 
method and underlying presumptions as to 
what phenomenology is or is not. 
For such an evaluation, however, there is 
needed some set of reasonable criteria 
whereby one can adjudicate a study’s rela-
tive validity, comprehensiveness, and 
merit (Madison 1988; Polkinghorne 1983; 
Smith 2011). Philosopher Brice R. 
Wachterhauser (1986, p. 234) argues that 
the need is “a set of practical guidelines 
that guide the pursuit of truth in the human 
sciences.” 
In developing such a possibility more 
concretely, Wachterhauser identifies four 
evaluative criteria, which I bring forward 
here because they are readily applicable to 
research in environmental and architec-
tural phenomenology. These four evalua-
tive criteria are: (1) comprehensiveness; 
(2) semantic depth; (3) inclusivity; and (4) 
architectonic structure.  They can be sum-
marized as follows (Seamon 2017, pp. 
351-352): 
 
1. Comprehensiveness, whereby the in-
terpretive account is complete in that it 
addresses essential aspects of the text or 
situation; without comprehensiveness, 
“any realm of experience will be one-
sided, and as such its truth will be 
threatened by distortion” (Wachterhau-
ser 1986, p. 234). 
2. Semantic depth, whereby the interpre-
tation evokes a thickness of interpretive 
understanding that incorporates past, 
present, and future experiences; the in-
terpretation “should be able to ‘prove 
itself’ over time by extending the 
reader’s present experience as it arises” 
(Wachterhauser 1986, p. 235). 
3. Inclusivity, whereby the interpretive 
text offers an encompassing frame of 
reference that incorporates and shelters 
less inclusive interpretive texts; the in-
terpretation offers a thoroughness “that 
demonstrates its superior truth over 
other texts in that it can give a more 
comprehensive interpretation of some 
phenomenon that is suggestive of both 
the strengths and weaknesses of other 
accounts” (Wachterhauser 1986, p. 
235). 
4. Architectonic structure, whereby the 
interpretation provides a fitting place 
for all the interpretive parts; the inter-
pretation works architectonically and 
teleologically “in that it orders and 
structures our experience into an intel-
ligible pattern” (Wachterhauser 1986, 
p. 235).   
 
These four criteria are useful because 
they link the relative quality of a phenom-
enological study with research results ra-
ther than with conceptual claims or meth-
odological procedures. Does the study pro-
vide a descriptive or conceptual structure 
whereby the particular phenomenon is pre-
sented thoroughly? Does the study offer an 
interpretation that resonates with many 
readers’ situations and makes sense in re-
lation to similar situations, whether past, 
present, or future? Does the study pay heed 
to other research related to the research 
topic, and does the study provide an inter-
pretive structure in which to place and clar-
ify that other research? Does the study suc-
cessfully integrate its descriptive and inter-
pretive parts into a larger conceptual struc-
ture that makes sense experientially and in-
tellectually? Wachterhauser (1986, p. 234) 
emphasizes that these criteria are not: 
 
rules in the sense of either necessary or 
sufficient conditions…. Instead these [cri-
teria] may be thought of as heuristic ideals 
that guide us in many situations of inquiry 
but do not bind us universally. 
 
In short, these four criteria attend to re-
search results rather than process and at 
least partly circumvent the three disagree-
ments highlighted earlier in relation to phe-
nomenological aims and methods. 
Wachterhauser’s criteria offer one means 
to “set aside” the many different phenom-
enological approaches and styles, instead 
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giving primary evaluative attention to thor-
oughness, soundness, rigor, and believabil-
ity [2]. 
 
3. Displacing phenomenology 
Though phenomenological research re-
mains an important part of the social and 
human sciences, there have been signifi-
cant efforts since the 1980s for revision, re-
juvenation, or elimination (see Cresswell 
2013, chaps. 9-12). This critique of phe-
nomenological work developed in a wide 
range of ways, sparked largely by post-
modernist thinking that included post-
structural, feminist, critical, assemblage, 
social-constructionist, and non-representa-
tional points of view (Seamon 2015). 
A major claim directing much of this 
work is the impossibility of identifying 
“deep, generative structures beneath the 
variety of the surface of life” (Cresswell 
2013, p. 207). Post-structural thinking 
moves away from order, unity, synthesis, 
generalization, and truth; rather, it empha-
sizes indeterminacy, diversity, local narra-
tives, particularity, and contingent possi-
bilities (Seamon 2015, p. 45). In many 
ways, post-structural perspectives contra-
dict the basic phenomenological principle 
assuming that human life involves a certain 
amount of unrecognized pattern and struc-
ture that can be progressively discovered 
and ordered via phenomenological efforts. 
If, however, much post-structural think-
ing calls phenomenology into question, 
there has also developed in the last several 
years a perspective most often called criti-
cal phenomenology or post-phenomenol-
ogy, a set of sometimes-contradictory per-
spectives whereby a good amount of phe-
nomenological thinking is maintained but 
extended in critical, post-structural ways 
(e.g., Ash and Simpson 2016; De Preester 
2019; Gibas 2019; Kinkaid 2019; Simon-
son 2012; Talebian and Uraz 2018). As ge-
ographer Jennifer Lea (2009, p. 374) ex-
plains, 
 
[N]one of these post-phenomenological 
accounts “leave behind” the phenomeno-
logical … but rather refigure what experi-
ence might be, where it might be located, 
how it comes about, and how we, as social 
scientists, might account for it. These post-
phenomenological modes of working re-
visit the resources offered by phenomenol-
ogy, critically returning to concepts such 
as “dwelling,” but working them through 
[in innovative ways] …. [A]ll these post-
phenomenological writings investigate ex-
actly what it means to transform, rather 
than abandon, phenomenologies, and in 
doing, continue to push the boundaries of 
what it means to be in the world. 
 
One recent effort to consider what post-
phenomenology and critical phenomenol-
ogy offer architectural and design concerns 
is a special 2018 issue of the architectural 
journal, Log, edited by architectural theo-
rist Bryan E. Norwood and entitled “diso-
rienting phenomenology.” Norwood uses 
the word “disorienting” because he claims 
that conventional phenomenological work 
presupposes an essentialist, universalist, 
place-bound subject unthinkingly imag-
ined as male, white, straight, abled, West-
ern, and privileged. 
In contrast, critical phenomenologists 
work to suspend their “stable clichés about 
the world and, importantly, about the sub-
ject” (Norwood 2018, p. 18). The aim is “to 
think about humanness without narrowing 
it to a holistic entity, to a transcendental 
identity that mirrors the root identity of 
colonizing, Enlightenment man” (Nor-
wood 2018, p. 19). The result might be “a 
way of facing uneasiness, difference, 
queerness, and otherness” (Norwood 2018, 
p. 19). 
In short, the critical-phenomenological 
aim is “to replace the normal with the 
strange and to challenge us to learn to live 
with disorientation” (Allen and Hosseinnia 
2018, p. 4). Most of the Log articles at-
tempt such “suspensions of normativity” 
as they might have architectural signifi-
cance. Adrienne Brown (2018, p. 28), for 
example, examines “architecture’s role in 
shaping the materialization of race.” Lisa 
Guenther (2018, p. 42) uses the example of 
gated communities as they become envi-
ronmental agents for producing places 
“partitioned and selectively shared among 
those who belong inside the security pe-
rimeter of the fence or wall, and from 
which those who do not belong are 
properly excluded on account of their per-
ceived impropriety.” Jos Boys considers 
how phenomenologies of bodily disable-
ness might shift taken-for-granted norms 
and attitudes: 
 
[O]bjects and spaces are not out there as 
sensory representations of our deepest 
psyches. Rather they… contribute to ena-
bling or disabling times and spaces 
through everyday conduct. Where norma-
tive social and material practices are dom-
inated by able-bodied rules and routines, 
and by able-bodied theories and dis-
courses—and where this very act of 
unacknowledged privilege and domination 
stems from an implicit and “com-
monsense” framing of bodies as separately 
abled or disabled, independent and active, 
or dependent and passive—then disability 
as a concept and disabled people as a con-
stituency disappear (Boys 2018, p. 65).  
 
In seeking to extend the range of human 
experience and to accommodate individu-
als and groups whose spheres of experi-
ence are different from the experiences of 
“universal man,” this work in critical and 
post-phenomenology offers valuable di-
rections for phenomenological research. 
What concerns me about the “critical” and 
“post-” labels is that almost everything 
these thinkers aim to accomplish can be 
readily accommodated by conventional 
phenomenological principles, concepts, 
and methods. 
Since the 1990s, for example, there has 
been significant work demonstrating that 
phenomenology can deal with individual 
and cultural differences (e.g., Chung-chi 
2004; Finlay 2011; Seamon 2015). I agree 
that phenomenology is concerned, first of 
all, with essential, universal dimensions of 
human experience—for example, the na-
ture of environmental embodiment or lived 
emplacement. But phenomenology also 
recognizes that there are other dimensions 
of experience: first, the fact that each of us 
is unique, and various aspects of that 
uniqueness—e.g., our age, gender, sexual-
ity, physical size, degree of abledness—
contribute to what human life is about. 
Second, we typically associate ourselves 
with a particular social, cultural, and eco-
nomic context—how we see ourselves ra-
cially, ethnically, politically, socio-eco-
nomically, religiously, and so forth. My 
point is that phenomenology as conven-
tionally understood can handle these ex-
traordinarily various aspects of human be-
ing. In short, there can be a phenomenol-
ogy of human differences as well as com-
monalities (Seamon 2018, p.178).  
I have little argument with the Log con-
tributors’ call for a more comprehensive 
phenomenology that confronts “the unfa-
miliar, the surprising, the unhomely” 
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(Legrand 2018, p. 23). I emphasize, how-
ever, that conventional phenomenological 
approaches and methods may deal with 
such matters best, simply because phenom-
enologists have already established a lan-
guage, stance, method and set of unique 
concepts (e.g., intentionality, natural atti-
tude, lifeworld, and homeworld) that read-
ily offer a place of openness to and for 
these themes. 
What is perhaps most problematic phe-
nomenologically about this special issue of 
Log is its calling into question certain invi-
olate aspects of human life and experience 
that are present regardless of sexual, social, 
cultural, or historical context. The most de-
batable concern is whether human beings 
can dispense with the importance of place, 
lived emplacement, and at-homeness. Nor-
wood (2018, p. 22) suggests that the need 
is 
 
to disquiet and disorient oneself, a way of 
dis-placing myself rather than projecting 
ways in which I can be more at home in a 
world that is mine. I am not trying to claim 
that an ethics of making humans at home is 
wrong…. Rather, I am suggesting that if 
this holistic norm is posited in advance of 
the practice of phenomenology, then a sub-
jectivity that does not experience that home 
will be positioned as damaged, as disa-
bled, as inadequate, as the still colonized 
Other. The way I am as a straight, white, 
middle-class man has been and remains 
privileged in the way the orientation and 
placing of the world is distributed. But it is 
not the measure of having a body schema 
or a body; it is only one configuration of a 
contingent set of practices and habits. The 
practice of phenomenology should provin-
cialize my embodiment rather than univer-
salize it. Architecture doesn’t need phe-
nomenology; it needs phenomenologies. 
 
As I emphasized above, phenomenolog-
ical research has always been able to con-
sider human life and experience in both its 
universal aspects (we are all human be-
ings) and its particular aspects (probing in-
dividual, social, cultural, economic, and 
historical differences). As far as individu-
als and groups who, for whatever reason, 
do not have or have lost their place and 
home (refugees, asylum seekers, homeless 
persons, people forcefully separated from 
their home place, the world’s wealthy who 
shift places regularly, and so forth), the 
question becomes whether emplacement, 
place, and at-homeness are integral constit-
uents of a “good life” and, if so, how pol-
icy, advocacy, design, and planning might 
help forge a renewed rootedness and at-
homeness. Never would a phenomenolog-
ical perspective claim, as Norwood inti-
mates, that the lives and experiences of 
these individuals are somehow “damaged” 
or “inadequate.” 
More broadly, the articles in this special 
issue of Log point to the considerable intel-
lectual and practical damage that post-
structural, critical, and social-construction-
ist perspectives have wrought in their em-
phasis on mobility, rootlessness, assem-
blages, rhizomes, and global flows at the 
expense of places, rootedness, at-home-
ness, environmental stability, and localities 
(Malpas 2018; Seamon 2018; Tomaney 
2012, 2015) [3]. 
Regardless of globalization and digital 
technologies, lived emplacement and 
places remain an inescapable stabilizing 
constituent of human life via which people 
are automatically provided one mode of 
spatial order and environmental identity. 
Unless human life becomes entirely virtual 
and independent of material environments, 
lived emplacement will remain an essential 
lifeworld quality. Place-related constitu-
ents like rootedness, at-homeness, and en-
vironmental identity are profoundly more 
experientially and existentially than the 
“fetishizing” of “loss or recovery” (Nor-
wood 2018, p. 12, note 4). 
In short, the importance of lived em-
placement in human life remains, even as 
many places of the world are transformed 
into placelessness and many of the world’s 
peoples are without place. As philosopher 
Jeff Malpas (2018, pp. 202-203) explains, 
 
Given that the fundamental structure of 
place and the relation to it cannot be 
treated as anything other than a necessary 
structure, the basic structure of place and 
the relation to place must indeed remain 
much the same now as it has been in the 
past. That this is so is reinforced by con-
sideration of the fact that the apparent loss 
of place… is something that itself occurs… 
in and through the experience of places…. 
If we distinguish between, on the one hand, 
place as a general and encompassing struc-
ture—the complex bounded and interwo-
ven structure of spatiality and temporal-
ity—and, on the other hand, place as it re-
fers to individual places, each of which has 
its own character…, then it is easy to see 
how place must persist, even in the face of 
the apparent loss of place. 
Places can be objects of experience—as 
I experience this place or that place—but 
place is also that within and out of which 
experience arises. Any experience of the 
world, along with the appearing of things 
within the world, will thus always be from 
within the embrace of place. What is de-
scribed as the loss of place is therefore 
more properly described as an experience 
of place in which place is seemingly ef-
faced in its very presentation. I find myself 
here, and yet in being here, I find nothing 
that marks off this place as distinctive—
that marks it off as just the place that it 
is…. 
Here is the experience of being in a 
place that nevertheless also appears in 
such a way that it obscures its very char-
acter as a place, and so one can say that 
the experience is almost like being no-
where at all [4]. 
 
Engaging place & architecture 
Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of 
thirty years of EAP editorship is recogniz-
ing that most phenomenologists continue 
to ignore the inescapable importance of 
materiality, space, and place in human life. 
For sure, there are exceptions—I immedi-
ately think of the work of anthropologist 
Chris Tilley (2010, Tilley and Cameron-
Dam 2017), geographer Edward Relph 
(2015, 2018), psychologist Eva-Maria 
Simms (2008), and philosophers Edward 
Casey (2009), Janet Donohoe (2014), Jeff 
Malpas (2018), Robert Mugerauer (2008), 
and Ingrid Leman Stefanovic (2000). 
Mostly, however, social and human sci-
entists have largely bypassed the inviolate 
lived fact that human being is always hu-
man-being-in-place. In relation to the next 
thirty years of phenomenological work, I 
hope that researchers direct attention to hu-
man beings’ lived immersion, entwine-
ment, and embeddedness in worlds that are 
always spatial, placial, environmental, and 
architectural. Who we are is partly a matter 
of where we are, and that “whereness” re-
quires vigorous phenomenological expli-
cation. 
From the very beginning, we have 
sought in EAP to showcase the wide range 
of ways in which phenomenology is prac-
ticed and to indicate that this work has con-
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siderable pragmatic significance. I con-
tinue to believe that much of the best phe-
nomenology does not call itself “phenom-
enological”—for example, architect Chris-
topher Alexander’s work on wholeness 
(Alexander 2002-05), naturalist Paul Kra-
fel’s efforts to counter environmental en-
tropy (Krafel 1998), or the work of ecol-
ogists Craig Holdrege (1998) and Mark 
Riegner (2008), who draw on the interpre-
tive method of Goethe to develop a phe-
nomenology of the natural world. 
Throughout EAP’s thirty years, we have 
sought to cover explicit and implicit phe-
nomenological work that facilitates a bet-
ter understanding of human life and sug-
gests how that understanding might have 
practical value for architecture, planning, 
policy development, and other means of 
place making.  
I end with a vignette of current New 
York City street life recently published in 
the New York Times’s regular Monday fea-
ture, “Metropolitan Diary.” Even in our 
hypermodern times, environments and 
places still thrive and provide one “taken-
for-granted” realm making daily life en-
gaging, memorable—even remarkable. 
 
My Harlem Window 
Dear Diary: 
The city finds its way through my Har-
lem window. 
The commuter train wails from the 
tracks above Lexington Avenue. Planes go-
ing west and south crisscross every half-
minute without incident. Sirens blare down 
Fifth Avenue. 
There is a gruff man who goes west in 
the morning, east in the afternoon. He is 
known around the neighborhood by his 
singular dress: a head-to-toe paint-splat-
tered canvas, a walking Pollock. 
There is the woman who waddles down 
the sidewalk, her thick hair bouncing in 
step and obscuring her face entirely except 
for the peepholes around her eyes. 
There is the actress who was on “Law & 
Order: Special Victims Unit.” There is a 
specked Grate Dane whose head is the 
same size as the newborn it is sniffing in its 
stroller. 
By three o’clock, there are children on 
low-riding bikes and young women howl-
ing with laughter as they rap in unison 
down the street. There is a couple fighting 
in the park. There is a painter whose house 
is boarded up after nearly burning down 
last year. He is unlocking his bike. 
There used to be a man whose faded suit 
hung over him loosely and bunched at his 
ankles as he crossed diagonally through 
the park at 5:45 p.m. each day for years. 
He wore a hat and looked down as he 
walked alone, mostly indistinguishable 
from any other man, from time itself. 
And then he vanished, and I often won-
der to where. 
 
—contributed by Selin Thomas, “Met-
ropolitan Diary,” New York Times, 
Monday, June 17, 2019, p. A20.  
 
Notes 
1. Since Zahavi published his first commentary on 
van Manen’s work (Zahavi 2019b), he has extended 
his criticism in a forthcoming article, “The Practice of 
Phenomenology: The Case of Max van Manen,” to be 
published in a 2020 issue of Nursing Philosophy; a 




In his recent book-length introduction to phenom-
enology, Zahavi (2019, pp. 122–129) is somewhat 
more supportive of the work of Giorgi, Smith, and van 
Manen. Zahavi (2019, p. 123) explains that “there is 
an ongoing controversy about how narrowly or 
broadly one should define what counts as phenome-
nological. Should phenomenological qualitative re-
search remain purely descriptive and seek to disclose 
essential structures, or should it rather focus on the 
particularity of individual persons and employ inter-
pretation? Should it embrace and adopt part of Hus-
serl’s philosophical methodology, or should it rather 
let its research be guided by various phenomenologi-
cal concepts and distinctions?” See this EAP issue’s 
“book note” on Zahavi’s volume, pp. 8–10. 
2. For a discussion of how these four criteria might 
be used to evaluate particular phenomenological re-
search, see Seamon 2017, in which I consider the rel-
ative merits of philosopher Karsten Harries’s natural 
symbols (Harries 1997); architect theorist Thomas 
Thiis-Evensen’s architectural archetypes (Thiis-
Evensen 1989); and comparative-religions scholar 
Lindsay Jones’s hermeneutics of sacred architecture 
(Jones 2000). 
3. From a phenomenological perspective, a major 
concern about the current postmodernist emphasis on 
mobility is that the lived wholeness of the movement-
rest relationship is reduced to the former only. Curi-
ously, much original phenomenological work on 
place emphasized the latter as the focus was on home 
and dwelling and too readily lost sight of movement, 
journey, and relationships among places. Today, the 
current dominance of globalization and digital tech-
nologies has contributed to a revised academic em-
phasis on mobility, networks, assemblages, rhizomes, 
and other post-structural concepts emphasizing con-
tinuous, dynamic change. Ultimately, the key phe-
nomenological recognition is that movement and rest 
are both integral to lived emplacement; the difficult 
conceptual and practical question is how the two are 
to be held together rather than severed. See Di Masso 
et al., 2019; Jager 1975; Seamon 2018, pp. 52-65, 
2020; Tomaney 2012, 2015. 
4. In criticizing the universalizing emphasis of 
“conservative” phenomenological thinking, Norwood 
(2018, pp. 11-15) contrasts the placial perspectives of 
architectural theorist Christian Norberg-Schulz 
(1971) and post-colonial writer and philosopher 
Édouard Glissant (1997), whose understanding of 
place relates to the slavery experience and speaks to 
“another type of human existence [that] takes shape 
and makes a different kind of place” (Norwood 2018, 
p. 12). Norwood argues that Norberg-Schulz’s under-
standing of place assumes a normative rootedness and 
dwelling that “has largely remained an assumed fea-
ture of architectural phenomenology” but must be 
called into question and “disoriented” (Norwood 
2018, p. 12). Norwood claims is that “the persistent 
limitations of architectural phenomenology result 
from unchecked presumptions on how humans should 
orient themselves.” These unexamined assumptions 
are said to focus on “a place, a home, circumscribed 
and bounded off” (Norwood 2018, p. 11). He contin-
ues: 
 
This place—Heidegger’s temple or hut perhaps—rep-
resents, for Norberg-Schulz and the conservative tra-
dition of the architectural interpretation of phenome-
nology, an imagined primitivity. It is a lost paradise 
authentically organized around a center. It also sig-
nifies a projected future wholeness, a place in which 
we, as individuals and collectives, are at home and to 
which a proper phenomenological attitude might at-
tune us (Norwood 2018, p. 11). 
 
Norwood (2018, p. 18) argues that the need is “sus-
pension of [these] stable clichés about the world,” but 
this assertion presupposes that these “clichés” are 
contingent rather than necessary. In Place and Expe-
rience, Malpas (2018, p. 197, note 22) argues that dis-
counting rootedness, at-homeness, and place is haz-
ardous existentially and historically because this point 
of view “refuse[s] what is a basic structure of human 
being and of the world as such.” Malpas accepts that 
home and place identity can readily be associated 
with “an obsessively introverted perspective, or with 
forms of xenophobic resistance to the unfamiliar and 
the foreign” (Malpas 2018, p. 197). He emphasizes, 
however, that it would be a serious mistake “to take 
such ‘pathologies of place’ as the norm and, on that 
basis reject place as inherently problematic or danger-
ous. To do so would be likely, in fact, to reinforce 
those same pathologies or else create new ones,” since 
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Twenty-three definitions of phenomenology (full citations follow definitions) 
1.   Phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experi-
ence (Sokolowski 2000, p. 2). 
2.   Phenomenology is the study of phenomena as experienced by human beings. The primary emphasis is on the phenomenon itself 
exactly as it reveals itself to the experiencing person in all its concreteness and particularity (Giorgi 1971, 9). 
3.   Phenomenology takes its starting point in a return to the “things” or “matters” themselves, that is, the world as we experience it. 
In other words, for phenomenologists, experience must be treated as the starting point and ultimate court of appeal for all philo-
sophical evidence (Brown and Toadvine 2003, p. xi). 
4. Phenomenology is the study of experience, particularly as it is lived and as it is structured through consciousness. “Experience” 
in this context refers not so much to accumulated evidence or knowledge as to something we “undergo.” It is something that 
happens to us and not something accumulated and mastered by us. Phenomenology asks that we be open to experience in this 
sense (Friesen, Henricksson, and Saevi 2012, p. 1). 
5.   The aim of phenomenology is to describe the lived world of everyday experience…. Phenomenological research into individual 
experiences gives insight into, and understanding of, the human condition. Sometimes it “languages” things we already know 
tacitly but have not articulated in depth. At other times, quite surprising insights reveal themselves…. (Finlay 2011, p. 26). 
6.    Phenomenology is best understood as a radical, anti-traditional style of philosophizing, which emphasizes the attempt to get to the 
truth of the matters, to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as 
it manifests itself to consciousness, to the experiencer. As such, phenomenology’s first step is to seek to avoid all misconstructions 
and impositions placed on experience in advance, whether these are drawn from religious or cultural traditions, from everyday 
common sense, or, indeed, from science itself. Explanations are not to be imposed before the phenomena have been understood 
from within (Moran 2000, p. 4). 
7.    As a method, [phenomenology] serves to remind us of the significance of the full range of meaning of human experience, in-
cluding taken-for-granted assumptions, values, and perceptions often forgotten about in analytic frameworks. In attending to 
pre-thematic ways of being-in-the-world, phenomenology helps to comprehend human behavior in its fullness (Stefanovic 
2015, p. 40).  
8.    Phenomenological method is driven by a pathos: being swept up in a spell of wonder about phenomena as they appear, show, 
present, or give themselves to us. In the encounter with the things and events of the world, phenomenology directs its gaze 
toward the regions where meanings and understandings originate, well up and percolate through the porous membranes of 
past sedimentations—then infuse, permeate, infect, touch, stir us, and exercise a formative and affective effect on our being 
(van Manen 2014, p. 26). 
9.    Phenomenology is an attempt to understand from the inside—and not to dismiss or criticize from the outside—the whole spectrum 
of experience which we generally call “reality” (Vesely 1988, p. 59). 
10.  Phenomenology never purely coincides with lived experience in itself, but by probing its ultimate horizons and seeking to grasp the 
englobing sense of what appears within them, renders lived experience anew. The subject matter is the intelligibility of lived expe-
rience, which phenomenology realizes essentially; and it is in rendering this “intelligibility” that the faithfulness of phenomenology 
to lived experience lies (Burch 1989, p. 195). 
11.  Phenomenology seems to take the ground away from under our feet, while at the same time giving us the sense of being where 
we have always been—only now recognizing it as if for the first time. It’s hard to catch hold of it because it’s like trying to 
catch something as it’s happening and which is over before we can do so. It can perhaps best be described most simply as 
“stepping back” into where we are already. This means shifting the focus of attention within experience into the experiencing 
of it. So if we consider seeing, for example, this means that we have to “step back” from what is seen into the seeing of what 
is seen (Bortoft 2012, p. 17).  
12.  Phenomenology recovers the order of truth as residing in things. It is not hidden, it does not lie under or behind or beneath 
things, and hence does not require Depth Theory to winkle it out. It is what is manifest (what shows) in things and how. If this 
is very obvious (as it must be) it yet requires a particular way of seeing and understanding in order to grasp it, for it can simply 
be no-seen at all (Scannell 1996, p. 169). 
13.  Phenomenology: The disciplined struggle “to let be,” to let being appear or break through (Buckley 1971, p. 199). 
14.  Phenomenology: The gathering together of what already belongs together even while apart (Mugerauer 1988, p. 216). 
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15.  Phenomenology: To let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself (Heidegger 
1962, p. 58). 
16. [Phenomenology] adopts no standpoint and provides no single direction of approach. [It] informs us simply that something we expe-
rience is to be disclosed, and this in turn means that it must somehow be hidden from us, though it may be superficially familiar. 
Phenomenology thus reveals itself as a gentle, responsive way of thinking. It tends to become what it studies. It is the method of 
imposing no method (Relph 1983, p. 201).  
17.  Phenomenology invites us to stay with “the experience itself,” to concentrate on its character and structure rather than whatever it is 
that might underlie or be causally responsible for it…. [Phenomenology] facilitates a return to experience, to awaken in us a sense 
of its importance by demonstrating the founding role of experience in our conception of the world, however sophisticated that con-
ception has become through the advancement of the natural sciences. In striving to awaken us to our own experience, to the phe-
nomena through which our conception of the world is constituted, phenomenology seeks to awaken us to ourselves, to make us 
alive to our existence as subjects who bear a kind of ultimate responsibility for that conception (Cerbone 2006, p. 3). 
18. [Phenomenology entails] letting things become manifest as what they are, without forcing our own categories on them… [T]he 
very essence of true understanding is that of being led by the power of the thing to manifest itself… Phenomenology is a means 
of being led by the phenomenon through a way of access genuinely belonging to it… Such a method… is not grounded in hu-
man consciousness and human categories but in the manifestness of the thing encountered, the reality that comes to meet us 
(Palmer 1969, p. 128). 
19. Phenomenology is the study of essences; and according to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of essences: the es-
sence of perceptions, or the essence of consciousness, for example. But phenomenology is also a philosophy that puts es-
sences back into existence, and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of [human beings] and the world from any start-
ing point other than that of their “facticity” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. vii). 
20. Many aspects of Husserl’s original formulation of phenomenology endure as central themes, including his catch cry “back to 
the things themselves” (Zu den Sachen selbst), which expressed the idea of the avoidance of metaphysical speculation, the 
attempt to gain a presuppositionless starting point, the use of description rather than causal explanation, and the attempt to 
gain insight into the essences of all kinds of phenomena (Moran 2001, p. 353). 
21. Phenomenology: The excavation of human experience, first, in terms of particular persons and groups in particular places, 
situations, and historical moments; and, second, as this excavation engenders a self-conscious effort to make intellectual and 
emotional sense of what that experience reveals in terms of broader lived structures and more ethical ways of being, willing, 
and acting (Seamon 2008, p. 15). 
22. Our relation to the world is so fundamental, so obvious and natural, that we normally do not reflect upon it. It is this domain 
of ignored obviousness that phenomenology seeks to investigate. The task of phenomenology is not to obtain new empirical 
knowledge about different areas in the world, but rather to comprehend the basic relation to the world that is supposed by 
any such empirical investigation…. The world is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, wonderful. It is a gift and a riddle. But in order to 
realize this, it is necessary to suspend our ordinary blind and thoughtless taking the world for granted (Zahavi 2019, p. 67). 
23. [The aim is] making evident an essential distinction among the possible ways in which the pregiven world, the ontic universe 
[das ontische Universum], can become thematic for us. Calling to mind what has repeatedly been said: the lifeworld, for us 
who wakingly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the “ground” of all praxis whether theoretical or 
extra-theoretical. The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, not occasionally 
but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-
certainty-of-the-world. Waking life is being awake to the world, being constantly and directly “conscious” of the world and 
of oneself as living in the world, actually experiencing [erleben] and actually effecting the ontic certainty of the world. 
             The world is pregiven thereby, in every case, in such a way that individual things are given. But there exists a fundamen-
tal difference between the way we are conscious of the world and the way we are conscious of things or objects (taken in the 
broadest sense, but still purely in the sense of the lifeworld), though together the two make up an inseparable unity. Things, 
objects (always understood purely in the sense of the lifeworld) are “given” as being valid for us in every case (in some 
mode or other of ontic certainty) but in principle only in such a way that we are conscious of them as things or objects within 
the world-horizon. Each one is something, “something of” the world of which we are constantly conscious as a horizon. 
            On the other hand, we are conscious of this horizon only as a horizon for existing objects; without particular objects of 
consciousness, it cannot be actual [aktuell]. Every object has its possible varying modes of being valid, the modalizations of 
ontic certainty. The world, on the other hand, does not exist as an entity, as an object, but exists within such uniqueness that 
the plural makes no sense when applied to it. Every plural, and every singular drawn from it, presupposes the world-horizon. 
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This difference between the manner of being of an object in the world and that of the world itself obviously prescribes funda-
mentally different correlative types of consciousness for them (Husserl 1970, pp. 142–143). 
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